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HAS HE "MADE HIS BED, AND NOW MUST
LIE IN IT"? TOWARD RECOGNITION OF THE
PRO SE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO POST-TRIAL READMONISHMENT
OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
JONA GOLDSCHMIDT*
Pro se defendants who unsuccessfully represent themselves at
trial know they have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel because
trial judges make sure they know about that right when consider-
ing their request to represent themselves. However, they do not
necessarily know they have a right to counsel after a guilty plea,
or a finding or verdict of guilt. Some courts hold that once a de-
fendant has waived his right to counsel, that waiver continues
throughout the subsequent stages of the prosecution. Other
courts hold that judges should readmonish the defendant of his
right to counsel, and appoint counsel upon request. Since the Su-
preme Court has come close but has not decided the issue, this
article reviews these respective court decisions and argues that the
Sixth Amendment requires judges to readmonish pro se defend-
ants post-trial of their right to counsel, and reappoint counsel
upon request.
* Professor, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, Loyola Uni-
versity Chicago; J.D., DePaul College of Law; Ph.D., Arizona State Univer-
sity). I wish to thank Jonathan Gradess, Executive Director of the New York
Defender Association, who alerted me to the unsettled law on the issue of
the pro se defendants' rights after trial and before sentencing, specifically, the
readmonishment of the right-to-counsel, and reappointment of counsel, is-
sues. I am indebted to Vincent Samar, Adjunct Professor at IT Chicago-
Kent College of Law, for his thoughtful comments on the manuscript, and to
whom I must give credit for, among other things, referring me to the StarTrek
metaphor used at the beginning of the paper.
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"I'm way over my head."1
"I want to fire myself."2
Volume 8, Number 2
1 McCormick v. Adams, 621 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010).
2 Charles v. State, 646 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2011).
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world in which people had many rights, but these
rights were only vaguely known. This is what Captain Kirk en-
counters in an episode of Star Trek, in which he meets the
Yangs, a people from the Omega IV planet, which has a culture
that is a close parallel of Earth's.3 Captain Kirk hears their chief
recite the Yangs' "holy words," which he realizes is a badly
slurred version of the Pledge of Allegiance. Kirk eventually in-
forms the Yangs that their "holy words" "were not merely writ-
ten for chiefs, but for everyone ... He [also] reads the 'greatest
of holies' - the preamble to the Constitution of the United
States of America, and tells [their chief] the words must apply to
everyone or they are meaningless." '4
This scenario is relevant to the situation facing some pro se
defendants who are found guilty after representing themselves
at trial, and who come to the realization - as did the defendants
quoted above - that the prosecutor outmatched them at trial,
and have second thoughts about continuing to represent them-
selves. Such defendants may or may not know they have a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at sentencing. They may assume
that they cannot have the assistance of counsel once they waived
that right in order to represent themselves. 5 So, what happens -
and what should happen - upon the judge or jury finding the
defendant guilty at trial? Should the defendant be readmon-
ished that he has a right to counsel?
3 See The Omega Episode, Memory Alpha, Star Trek Wiki, http://en.memo
ry-alpha.org/wiki/TheOmega-Glory-(episode)(http://en.memory-alpha.org/
wiki/TheOmega-Glory_(episode) (last visited OctoberOct. 29, 2014).
4 Id.
5 The Supreme Court has not yet held that the Sixth Amendment right to
self-representation extends to sentencing. For a thorough discussion of the
question. See State v. Reddish, 859 A.2d 1173, 579-86 (N.J. 2004) (finding a
Sixth Amendment right of defendants in both the guilt and penalty phases in
capital cases to represent themselves).
Volume 8, Number 2 Spring 2015;
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Surprisingly, some courts hold that the defendant is not enti-
tled to be readmonished because a waiver of the right to counsel
at or before trial continues throughout post-trial proceedings.6
In so holding, these courts in effect - by not informing the pro se
defendant of his7 right to withdraw or revoke his waiver of coun-
sel - do not recognize that, while the pro se defendant may have
waived his right to counsel before or during trial, he still, I ar-
gue, has a continuing right to assistance (or reappointment) of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment s at sentencing, absent bad
faith (i.e., "gaming the system") conduct. Some courts disagree,
holding that the right to counsel is not a continuing and absolute
(or presumptive) right once waived, and that the matter of reap-
pointment of counsel is one for the court's discretion.9 My argu-
ment against this view is premised on the clearly established
Supreme Court case law recognizing that the right to counsel
attaches at all "critical stages" 10 of a prosecution, of which sen-
tencing and post-trial motions" are generally accepted to be,
and the unique criticality and complexity of sentencing which
makes the assistance of counsel a necessity. The minimal bur-
6 See infra notes 76-79, and accompanying text.
7 References to "he" include "she."
8 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the assistance of
counsel for his defense." Amendment 6, U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. VI.
9 See infra notes 208-278 and accompanying text.
10 See infra, notes 158, 285, and accompanying text.
11 Post-trial motions, sometimes taking place before and sometimes after
sentencing, are by implication included in my argument whenever sentencing
is mentioned. While we have no name for the post-trial, pre-sentencing
stage, it is undeniably a critical stage in the prosecution, as is the sentencing
stage itself. It is a crucial stage for filing mandatory post-trial motions,
Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (motion for new trial is a
critical stage in the prosecution); Johnston v. Mizell, 912 F.2d 172, 176 (7th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 11094 (1991) (post-trial motion for a new
trial is a critical stage in Illinois); King v. State, 613 So.2d 888 (Ct. Ala. Crim.
App. 1993) (motion for a new trial is a critical stage in the prosecution), and
for requesting the trial court to reconsider certain rulings, or to preserve ap-
pellate issues.
Volume 8, Number 2
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291 READMONISHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
den on courts from post-trial readmonishment is far outweighed
by the benefits to the defendant and the justice system.
Thus, a defendant in those courts that accept the "continuing
waiver" theory is like a member of the Yangs on Omega IV,
who only vaguely knows that he has a right (in this case, to
counsel), without a further understanding that this right contin-
ues through all critical stages of the prosecution, including sen-
tencing and post-trial motions, in the absence of disruptive or
dilatory conduct by the defendant. While the courts that accept
the continuing waiver theory appear to be in the minority,12 this
article argues for a rejection of that theory. In so doing, it ad-
dresses two questions that were left unanswered by the Supreme
Court when it recognized that the Sixth Amendment affords a
right to self-representation: 3 (1) Is the trial judge obligated
before sentencing to re-admonish the pro se defendant of his
continuing Sixth Amendment right to have the assistance of
counsel? And, (2) whether or not there is such a judicial duty,
does the court nevertheless have a presumptive, non-discretion-
ary duty to appoint counsel upon the defendant's specific
request?
While some courts hold that no readmonishment of the right
to counsel is necessary because pro se defendants are bound by
their earlier waiver of counsel that continues through the sen-
tencing stage, 14 in some of these cases a dissenting opinion is
heard arguing against the majority's "they made their bed" jus-
tification for declining to inform the defendant of the right to
12 But see People v Baker, 440 N.E.2d 856, 859 (Ill. 1982), which referred to
the "greater number of courts considering the precise issue here presented
have held that a competent waiver of counsel by a defendant once made
before the court carries forward to all subsequent proceedings unless defen-
dant later requests counsel or there are circumstances which suggest that the
waiver was limited to a particular stage of the proceedings." (emphasis
added)
13 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
14 See infra Part IV.A.
Volume 8, Number pSpring 2015
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counsel at sentencing.' 5 Fortunately, most courts find a Sixth
Amendment violation whenever the trial judge fails to conduct a
Faretta hearing at or before sentencing (or resentencing after an
appeal), before allowing the defendant's request for self-repre-
sentation; these courts require that trial judges inform the de-
fendant of his right to counsel, the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, and the maximum possible sentence.' 6
Other courts acknowledge that Faretta warnings are required,
but permit a modified, less detailed colloquy. 17 Lastly, there are
those courts that hold that generally no readmonishment of the
right to counsel is required, subject to exceptions for special
circumstances. 18
It is hoped that, in the event the Supreme Court hears a case
involving the issues discussed, this article will contribute to its
recognition of a generally-recognized Sixth Amendment right of
pro se defendants to readmonishment of their right to counsel
before sentencing, and a concomitant judicial duty to appoint
counsel to such indigent defendants at sentencing upon their re-
quest, absent dilatory or obstructionist ("cat and mouse"19) con-
duct regarding their representation.
Part I describes the English common law history of the right
to counsel, and its evolution in American constitutional law. It
also discusses the significance of the right to counsel as reflected
in various Supreme Court decisions. Part II reviews the duty of
courts to secure a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel from those who seek to dismiss their attorney, as well as
15 See infra Part IV.B.
16 See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
17 See Id.
18 See infra Part IV.C.1-2.
19 Evans v. State, 273 So.2d 495, 564 (Miss. 1973); United States v. Smith, 413
F.3d 1253, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 2005). A WESTLAW search ("cat and mouse"
representation counsel) in the combined all-state cases and all-federal cases
database reveals the term has been used in 182 criminal case decisions involv-
ing issues of right to counsel and right to self-representation.
Volumes8, Number 2 Spring 2015
6
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 10
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol8/iss2/10
29) REAEDMONISHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
the additional requirements of conducting an adequate Faretta20
hearing to warn the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation. It describes recent developments defin-
ing the required contents of the Faretta colloquy.
Part III describes the Supreme Court's characterization of
some stages of a criminal prosecution as "critical," and what fac-
tors it considers in making this determination. It argues that
sentencing is uniquely critical and complex, more so than other
critical stages. Counsel is essential - not just in capital cases - to
navigate sentencing and post-trial motion stages. It also dis-
cusses court approaches to the special case of pro se defendants
who - often in capital cases - decline to present any evidence in
mitigation. Courts have recognized the necessity of counsel
under these circumstances and required counsel to be
appointed.
Part IV then reviews the different positions courts now take
to address the questions of post-trial readmonishment. There
are those that hold no readmonishment is required, or may be
required only in special circumstances, and those that recognize
it should be given in all cases. Part IV also discusses two related
readmonishment issues: the "clearly established" law require-
ment under the AEDPA for granting federal habeas relief,
which results in a denial of collateral relief in many state pris-
oner cases, and the issue of whether a Sixth Amendment right-
to-counsel violation constitutes structural error requiring rever-
sal or is subject to the harmless error rule which does not.
The article concludes that the Constitution requires pro se de-
fendants be specifically informed of their post-trial right to
counsel to assist them in post-trial motions and at sentencing.
Volume 8, Number 2
20 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S., supra note 13, at 806 (1975).
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I. EVOLUTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Before the English Revolution of 1688, defendants in felony
cases were not permitted to have counsel, except where ques-
tions of law would arise, and yet they were permitted to appear
in petty offense cases.21 In 1696 Parliament passed The Treason
Act, permitting lawyers to assist defendants in treason cases. 22
Thereafter, throughout the eighteenth century courts began to
permit counsel for the defense in felony cases as a consequence
of the Crown's and victims' increasing use of private attorneys
to prosecute crimes.23 Counsel's role, however, was restricted
because judges and jurors needed to hear the accused speak for
himself and personally answer the charges. 24 It took decades for
lawyers in England to expand the scope of their assistance to the
point at which they, and not the defendant, would be the sole
spokesperson for the defense. 25 Until then, it was the judge who
safeguarded the interests of the private prosecutor (i.e., the vic-
tim of the crime, or a paid, private prosecutor) and the defen-
21 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (Ox-
ford Studies in Modern Legal History) 27 (2005) (hereafter ADVERSARY
TRIAL).). Blackstone was highly critical of the refusal of courts to allow
counsel for treason or felony cases: "[It] seems to be not at all of a piece with
the rest of the humane treatment of prisoners by the English law. For upon
what face of reason can that assistance be denied to save the life of a man,
which yet is allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass?" 4 WIL-
LIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 49 (1769).
22 LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL supra note 21, at 67.
23 Id. at 167-70.
24 Id. at 170-71.
25 Id. at 177.
Volume 8, Number 2
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2 5 RADMONISHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
dant.26 It was not until 1836 that Parliament enacted a statute
permitting defense counsel in felony cases.27
In America, the Framers of the Constitution ensured that the
right to "assistance of counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment was applicable to both felony and treason cases.28 The
question left open in the text of the Amendment is whether the
government has any obligation to provide counsel to indigent
defendants. While self-representation was common at the time
the Bill of Rights was adopted,29 the predominant practice in the
first half of the eighteenth century was for members of the
emerging bar to represent indigent defendants as a matter of
public spirit or the quest for experience or publicity.30
26 JAMES J. ToMKOVicz, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 5 (2002). "Ordi-
narily, the two sides were relatively equal in terms of legal training and skill.
There was no great likelihood that a highly skilled prosecutor would take
advantage of a less skilled defendant. There was no evidence imbalance of
ability that called for the remedy of trained defense counsel. As long as the
prosecution was handled by laypersons, an impartial judge could adequately
protect the interests of the lay accused." Id.
27 Trials for Felony Act, 1836, 6 and 7 W.4, c. 114, s. 1, 2 (1836).U.K.).
28 Several colonies and states included a right to defense counsel in their
constitutions (Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Penn-
sylvania), by statute (North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vir-
ginia), or both (Delaware, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania) before the right
was enshrined in 1791 in the Sixth Amendment. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 26,
at 10-11.
29 TOMKOVICZ, supra note 26, at 13-14. "One explanation offered for the
prevalence of self-representation is the distrust of lawyers that flourished ini-
tially in the colonies ... [and another is] the fact that trained legal assistance
was not generally available." Id. at 14. The right to self-representation in the
colonial era was reflected in charters and declarations of rights, and statutes
that prohibited representation by counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S.supra note 13 at
826-27, 830, citing Daniel Boorstin, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPE-
RIENCE 197 (1958). The right is now ensconced in the constitutions of 36
states. Faretta, 422 U.S.supra note 13 at 813.
30 Donald A. Dripps, Right -to-Counsel Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE
TO THE CONSTITUTION 462 (David F. Forte and Matthew Spalding, Eds.) (2d
ed.) (. 2014).), available at http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/amend
ments/6/essays/158/right-to-counsel-clause.
Volume 8, Number 2 Spring 2015
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The evolution of the right to assistance of counsel for indigent
defendants in America is well known. It was not until 1932 in
Powell v. Alabama, the infamous "Scottsboro Boys" case, that
the Supreme Court held states were obligated under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to appoint coun-
sel for indigent defendants in serious felony or capital cases.31
In the oft-quoted language of Justice Sutherland's opinion for
the Court:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is in-
capable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfa-
miliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he have a perfect one. He requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be
not guilty, he faces the dangers of conviction be-
cause he does not know how to establish his inno-
cence. If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or
federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a
party by counsel, employed by and appearing for
him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a
refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, there-
fore, of due process in the constitutional sense.32
Volume 8, Number 2
31 Powell et al. v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
32 287 U.S. 45,Id. at 68 (1932).
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In its 1938 decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Supreme Court
recognized that the Sixth Amendment entitled indigent defend-
ants in federal criminal cases to court-appointed counsel. 33 In
this case, two Marine enlistees were charged in the U.S. District
Court in South Carolina with uttering and passing counterfeit
U.S. currency.34 They were tried, convicted, and sentenced with-
out counsel.35 After their imprisonment in the U.S. Penitentiary
in Atlanta, they filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus based
on Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel grounds, which was de-
nied by the District Court.36 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari "due to the importance of the
questions involved." 37
In finding a Sixth Amendment violation, the Court referred to
the right to counsel as "necessary to insure fundamental human
rights of life and liberty." 38
The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admo-
nition that if the constitutional safeguards it pro-
vides be lost, justice will not 'still be done.' It
embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious
truth that the average defendant does not have the
professional legal skill to protect himself when
brought before a tribunal with power to take his
life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is
presented by experienced and learned counsel.
That which is simple, orderly, and necessary to the
lawyer-to the untrained layman-may appear intri-
33 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
34 Id. at 459-60.
35 Id. at 460.
36 Id. at 459. The District Court agreed that their right to counsel was de-
nied, but held that the deprivation was "not sufficient 'to make the trial void
and justify its annulment in a habeas corpus proceeding, but that they consti-
tuted trial errors or irregularities which could only be corrected on ap-
peal'."appeal.'" Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 462.
Volume 8, Number 2 Spring 2O015
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cate, complex, and mysterious. Consistently with
the wise policy of the Sixth Amendment and other
parts of our fundamental charter, this Court has
pointed to ". .. the humane policy of the modern
criminal law..." which now provides that a defen-
dant "... . if he be poor, . . . may have counsel fur-
nished him by the state,... not infrequently...
more able than the attorney for the state." 39
After citing Justice Sutherland's characterization of the im-
portance of the right to counsel in Powell, the Court held that
the Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts "the power
and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless
he has or waives the assistance of counsel." 40 Moreover, while
the purpose of the right to counsel is "to protect an accused
from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal
and constitutional rights," the Court added: "the guaranty
would be nullified by a determination that an accused's ignorant
failure to claim his rights removes the protection of the Consti-
tution."41 While the former portion of the Court's statement fo-
cused on the role of the right to counsel as being to protect an
accused from a "conviction" based on the defendant's ignorance
of legal and constitutional rights, the latter part has relevance to
the issue discussed here, namely the situation of an accused's
"failure to claim his rights" at sentencing.
The Court went on to state that compliance with the Sixth
Amendment "is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a fed-
eral court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.
If the accused, however, is not represented by counsel and has
not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right,
the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid
conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty." 42
39 Id. (citations omitted).
40 Id. at 463.
41 Id. at 465.
42 Id. at 467-68 (emphasis added).
Volume 8, Number 2
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Through the italicized language, the Court recognized that the
right to counsel extends not only to the guilt or innocence phase
of the criminal prosecution, but to the sentencing stage of a
prosecution as well.
In Betts v. Brady, the Supreme Court considered the habeas
corpus petition of a state court defendant who had been denied
his request for counsel because the State of Maryland only pro-
vided counsel for indigent defendants in cases of rape or mur-
der.4 3 The issue presented was whether the denial of counsel
amounted to a denial of Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.44 The Court held that the clause only applied to federal
courts, and did not incorporate the rights set forth in the Sixth
Amendment. 45 The Court supported its decision by referring to
English common law, which permitted counsel to appear only
for collateral matters and on questions of law, 4 6 and by refer-
ence to the early practice of the American states, which was not
uniform with respect to appointment of counsel as a matter of
right.47 The Court concluded that the cases did not involve a
43 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 457 (1942).
44 Id. at 461.
45 Id. at 461-62. The Court reasoned that:
Asserted denial [of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in
a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a de-
nial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of
justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other
considerations, fall short of such denial. In the application of
such a concept there is always the danger of falling into the
habit of formulating the guarantee into a set of hard and fast
rules the application of which in a given case may be to ignore
the qualifying factors therein disclosed.
Id. at 462.
46 Id. at 466.
47 After reviewing various state constitutions and statutes at the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Court concluded:
This material demonstrates that, in the great majority of the
states, it has been the considered judgment of the people, their
representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is
not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial. On the con-
Volume 8, Number 2r
.Spring 2015
13
Goldschmidt: Has He "Made His Bed, and Now Must Lie in It"?  Toward Recognitio
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice )00
denial of "fundamental fairness," thus the petitioner was not de-
nied his right to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.48
There then followed a series of Supreme Court cases in which
the Court applied the language in Powell v. Alabama, which re-
ferred to the right to counsel as applying only in "special circum-
stances," such as capital cases. 49 In Hamilton v. Alabama, the
Court held a defendant in a capital case did not need to make a
showing of specific need for or prejudice from the lack of coun-
sel because in a capital case there is an inherent right to coun-
sel.50 In non-capital cases, the Court continued to find that a
deprivation of "fundamental fairness" would result if counsel
trary, the matter has generally been deemed one of legislative
policy. In the light of this evidence we are unable to say that
the concept of due process incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment obligates the states, whatever may be their own
views, to furnish counsel in every such case. Every court has
power, if it deems proper, to appoint counsel where that course
seems to be required in the interest of fairness.
Id. at 470.
48 Id. at 473. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that the defendant,
charged with robbery, adequately represented himself:
The simple issue was the veracity of the testimony for the State
and that for the defendant. . . . [T]he accused was not helpless,
but was a man forty-three years old, of ordinary intelligence
and ability to take care of his own interests on the trial of that
narrow issue. He had once before been in a criminal court,
pleaded guilty to larceny and served a sentence and was not
wholly unfamiliar with criminal procedure. It is quite clear that
in Maryland, if the situation had been otherwise and it had ap-
peared that the petitioner was, for any reason, at a serious dis-
advantage by reason of the lack of counsel, a refusal to appoint
would have resulted in the reversal of a judgment of conviction.
Id. at 472-73.
49 287 U.S. 45,Powell, supra note 31, at 71 (1932). . See, e.g., Williams v.
Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945);
Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663
(1947); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596
(1948).
50 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961).
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were not appointed where the defendant's personal characteris-
tics made it unlikely that he could present an adequate defense
on his own,51 where the charges or possible defenses were com-
plex,52 or where events occurred at trial that raised issues of
prejudice. 53
Then, in Gideon v. Wainright, the Supreme Court finally held
that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel was in-
corporated into the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and was binding on states.54 Defen-
dant Clarence Gideon was charged with breaking into a pool
room with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, which was a
felony under Florida law. 55 He was unable to afford an attor-
ney, and his request for appointment of counsel was denied.56
He conducted his defense "about as well as could be expected
from a layman." 57 Noting the similarity of the facts in Betts v.
Brady, the Court concluded that Betts should be overruled.58
The Court reasoned that at the time Betts was decided, there
was "ample precedent for acknowledging that those guarantees
of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty
immune from federal abridgment are equally protected against
state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
51 See, e.g., Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (youth and immaturity);
Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954) (insanity or mental illness).
52 See, e.g., Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Rice
v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
53 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 772 (1949) (overreaching by court or
prosecutor); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (prejudicial proceedings
at sentencing).
54 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 352 (1963).
55 Id. at 336-37.
56 Id. at 337.
57 Id. "He made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the
State's witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify
himself, and made a short argument 'emphasizing his innocence to the charge
contained in the Information filed in this case.' The jury returned a verdict of
guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to serve five years in the state prison,"
quoting his habeas corpus petition. Id. (footnote omitted).
58 Id. at 339.
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Amendment." 59 The Court noted the existing precedents that
recognized the fundamental character of the First Amendment,
the Fifth Amendment's just compensation clause, the Fourth
Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment.60 It declared that, "the Court in Betts was
wrong in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
counsel is not one of these fundamental rights." 61
Citing, inter alia, the earlier precedents of Powell v. Alabama
and Johnson v. Zerbst, the Gideon Court concluded:
[T]he Court in Betts v. Brady made an abrupt
break with its own well-considered precedents. In
returning to these old precedents, sounder we be-
lieve than the new, we but restore constitutional
principles established to achieve a fair system of
justice. Not only these precedents but also reason
and reflection require us to recognize that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is pro-
vided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious
truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite
properly spend vast sums of money to establish
machinery to try defendants accused of crime.
Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed es-
sential to protect the public's interest in an orderly
society. Similarly, there are few defendants
charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire
the best lawyers they can get to prepare and pre-
sent their defenses. That government hires law-
yers to prosecute and defendants who have the
money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest in-
dications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers
59 Id. at 341.
60 Id. at 341-42.
61 Id. at 342.
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in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.
The right of one charged with crime to counsel
may not be deemed fundamental and essential to
fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From
the very beginning, our state and national consti-
tutions and laws have laid great emphasis on pro-
cedural and substantive safeguards designed to
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the
law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor
man charged with crime has to face his accusers
without a lawyer to assist him.62
Commentators have for many years expounded on the signifi-
cance of the right to counsel. The right to counsel has been
characterized as "the lynchpin of constitutional protection,"63
the "master key" 64 to all the rules and procedures designed to
ensure the reliability of the guilt-determining process, and "the
most pervasive right" of the accused. 65
Without a lawyer's aid, it is quite unlikely that an
accused will be able to enjoy the advantages of the
other enumerated rights. Without counsel, there
62 Id. at 344. See also, ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 218 (1964)
("His triumph there shows that the poorest and least powerful of men - a
convict without even a friend to visit him in prison - can take his case to the
highest court in the land and bring about a fundamental change in the law.")
63 RONALD J. ALLEN, ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 103
(2001).
64 Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1,7 (1962).
65 Walter V. Shaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 8 (1956). See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84-85 (1988), where the
Supreme Court quoted Shaefer in support of its holding that the Ohio appel-
late court erred in allowing appellate counsel to withdraw without filing an
Anders brief verifying a total lack of viable issues, and without later ap-
pointing counsel after that court identified certain colorable issues, which
"deprived both petitioner and itself of the benefit of an adversary examina-
tion and presentation of the issues.").
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is little chance for a fair battle between equally
able adversaries. Counsel's most basic role is to
ensure that the confrontation between opponents
contemplated by our Constitution actually does
take place.66
Professor Tomkovicz, in his seminal study of the right to coun-
sel, points out that courts have taken two perspectives of the
right. One focuses on the substantive value of counsel's assis-
tance: "This view holds that the object of a lawyer's assistance is
primarily, if not exclusively, to ensure that criminal prosecutions
arrive at reliable, truthful, resolutions."67 The other view is that
the procedural value of the right is also critical: "This perspec-
tive maintains that excessive emphasis on the substantive contri-
butions that defense lawyers make to the outcomes of
proceedings is misguided and fails to account for the essential
role that counsel plays in ensuring that those outcomes are
achieved by means of fair procedures." 68 The Supreme Court
has not provided clear support for one or the other perspective,
but readers of its decisions "should be attentive to this basic
conceptual tension and to the impacts that it has on right to
counsel law."69 This article approaches the right to counsel from
the latter perspective, focusing on the significance of the right in
so far as the sentencing stage of a criminal case, rather than on
the guilt or innocence phase.
66 ToMKOVICZ, supra note 26, at. 128.
67 Id. at xxiv.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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II. WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, AND THE RIGHT
TO SELF-REPRESENTATION
A. Waiver Requirements
Johnson v. Zerbst7° continues to be the leading case that sets
forth the general principles that guide courts in the determina-
tion of whether a defendant has properly waived his right to
counsel. First, courts are to "'... indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." 7'
Courts "'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamen-
tal rights'." 72 Second, a waiver of a constitutional right is ordi-
narily "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege." 73 There is no one test for waiver:
"The determination of whether there has been an intelligent
waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, includ-
ing the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.."74
In addition, the trial court has certain duties in so far as the
waiver determination:
The constitutional right of an accused to be repre-
sented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection
of a trial court, in which the accused-whose life or
liberty is at stake-is without counsel. This protect-
ing duty imposes the serious and weighty responsi-
bility upon the trial judge of determining whether
there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the
accused. While an accused may waive the right to
counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should
70 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Zerbst, supra note 33.
71 Id. at 464, citing Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)
and Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882).
72 304 U.S.Zerbst, supra note 33, at 464, citing Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
73 Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
74 Id.
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be clearly determined by the trial court, and it
would be fitting and appropriate for that determi-
nation to appear upon the record. 75
Note the descriptive words used for the required waiver collo-
quy in the Court's language just cited: "intentional" relinquish-
ment or abandonment (which generally equates to "voluntary" 76
relinquishment); a "known" right; an "intelligent" and "compe-
tent" waiver. Subsequent waiver case law from the Supreme
Court 77 and lower courts often use the terms interchangeably,78
and in different combinations, but each of these terms can give
rise to separate appellate issues and claims. These appellate
waiver cases arise from all stages of a prosecution: pretrial, trial,
and post-trial (including post-trial motions or sentencing) stages.
A defendant may claim that his waiver was ineffective be-
cause he felt compelled to waive counsel (i.e., forced to proceed
pro se) for various reasons.79 It may be that the trial judge had
75 Id. at 465.
76 See e.g., Pazden v. Maurer, C.A.3 (N.J.) 2005, 424 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2005)
(waiver held involuntary where trial judge unreasonably denied a defense
lawyer's request for continuance, the lawyer admitted he was unprepared for
trial, and the defendant was thereupon forced to proceed pro se).
77 See, e.g., As to guilty pleas, the Court has described the required waiver
of the right to counsel and trial rights as having to be both "knowing and
voluntary" and "voluntary and intelligent," Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29
(1992); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948) (presiding judge
must ensure that defendant's waiver of right to counsel is "intelligent and
competent" before permitting the entry of a guilty plea); North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) (holding that guilty plea that is not "voluntary
and knowing" it denies due process).
78 See e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 7 F.3d 81, 86 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[T]here is
no reason to believe that Vasquez was aware of his right to counsel at the
hearing. Nowhere in the transcript of the hearing did the Judge inform Vas-
quez of this right or in any way seek to insure that Vasquez had voluntarily
chosen to waive this important right. Thus, there is simply nothing to support
any argument that Vasquez knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel at this hearing.").
79 Lopez v. Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming de-
nial of state prisoner's habeas petition where trial judge granted his motion
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improperly encouraged self-representation, s0 or did not do
enough to try to dissuade him from proceeding pro se. Dissua-
sion such as failing to explain the ways in which a lawyer could
assist him,8 or because granting his motion to proceed pro se in
and of itself denied him the right to a fair trial since his "per-
formance at trial was - as everybody involved except him surely
expected - a complete disaster." 82 Those claims would be based
on a lack of voluntariness.
Another defendant may claim a lack of knowing and intelli-
gent waiver if the trial court failed to inform him, after his guilty
plea, of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se at
sentencing.83 The court also could have failed to do so before
denying his right to self-representation, 84 failed to provide the
defendant with the possible maximum sentence during the
waiver colloquy, 85 and failed to inquire about his knowledge of
the charges against him.86 Other defendants may argue that
their waiver was not "intelligently" made because they did not
have certain information (beyond the potential maximum penal-
ties), such as the collateral consequences that may result from a
conviction, or were not warned that if they proceeded pro se
and took the witness stand, that their prior convictions could be
brought out for impeachment.87 Lastly, because waiver of the
right to counsel can occur at any stage, waiver case law arises at
different stages of the prosecution. The only exception to the
to proceed pro se after trial, and then denied his request for counsel after
sentencing hearing began, holding his original waiver was valid).
80 People v. Burgener, 206 P.3d 420, 427 (Calif. 2009).
81 United States v. Dahler, 171 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1999).
82 United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999).
83 United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1987).
84 United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 626 ((9th Cir. 1999) (Plea held
involuntary where "wrongful refusal of Hernandez's self-representation re-
quest imposed 'unreasonable restraints' on his decision whether to plead
guilty.").
85 United States v. Crowhurst, 596 F.2d 389, 390 (9th Cir. 1979).
86 United States v. Cash, 47 F.3d 1083, 1088 (11th Cir. 1995).
87 Strozier v. Newsome, 926 F.2d 1100, 1104 (11th Cir. 1991).
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right to waive counsel in a criminal case 88 is for "gray area" pro
se defendants. That is, those who are found competent but have
mental or emotional problems; for these pro se defendants the
trial court has the discretion to appoint unwanted counsel.8 9
B. The Faretta Colloquy Requirement
The substance of the colloquy in which trial judges must en-
gage with defendants who seek to represent themselves has cer-
tain basic elements, as first established by the Supreme Court in
Faretta v. California.9° The Court in Faretta was presented with
the following issue:
[W]hether a defendant in a state criminal trial has
a constitutional right to proceed without counsel
when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do
so. Stated another way, the question is whether a
State may constitutionally hale a person into its
criminal courts and then force a lawyer upon him,
even when he insists that he wants to conduct his
own defense. It is not an easy question, but we
have concluded that a State may not constitution-
ally do so.91
The state trial judge had first permitted the defendant's re-
quest to proceed pro se, but then reversed himself at a subse-
quent pretrial hearing based on the defendant's answers to
88 Obviously, courts have the authority to appoint counsel in civil cases over
the objection of a minor, a mentally incompetent person, or a ward of the
state.
89 Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 172-17373 (2008), critiqued in Jona
Goldschmidt, Autonomy and the "Gray-Area" Pro Se Defendants: Ensuring
Competence to Guarantee Freedom, 6 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 130 (2011) (argu-
ing that the Court improperly elevated justice system's interest in avoidance
of a "spectacle" over the pro se defendant's right to autonomy, and propos-
ing alternative methods of pro se assistance to supplement the current "all or
nothing" forms of representation).
90 422 U.S.Faretta, supra note 13 at 806 (1975).
91 Id. at 807.
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questions that the judge posed about his ability to represent
himself, the hearsay rule, and the law governing challenges to
prospective jurors.92
The Court first reviewed the history of the right to self-repre-
sentation in American state and federal law, and cited its earlier
opinion in Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,93 in which it
had recognized the Constitution "'does not force a lawyer upon
a defendant'." 94 The Court recited this language from Adams:
'The right to assistance of counsel and the correla-
tive right to dispense with a lawyer's help are not
legal formalisms. They rest on considerations that
go to the substance of an accused's position before
the law ....
'... What were contrived as protections for the
accused should not be turned into fetters .... To
deny an accused a choice of procedure in circum-
stances in which he, though a layman, is as capable
as any lawyer of making an intelligent choice, is to
impair the worth of great Constitutional safe-
guards by treating them as empty verbalisms.
'... . When the administration of the criminal law
... is hedged about as it is by the Constitutional
safeguards for the protection of an accused, to
deny him in the exercise of his free choice the
right to dispense with some of these safeguards...
is to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the
Constitution'95
After finding that its own cases and those of federal courts
showed "a nearly universal conviction, on the part of our people
as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling
92 Id. at 808-10.
93 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
94 Id. at 815, quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 279.
95 422 U.S.Faretta, supra note 13, at 815, quoting Adams, 317 U.S.supra note
93, at 279-80.
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defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he
truly wants to do SO,"96 the Court proceeded to a close reading
of the Sixth Amendment, and found:
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely
that a defense shall be made for the accused; it
grants to the accused personally the right to make
his defense. It is the accused, not counsel, who
must be 'informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation,' who must be 'confronted with the wit-
nesses against him,' and who must be accorded
'compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor.' Although not stated in the Amendment in
so many words, the right to self-representation-
to make one's own defense personally-is thus
necessarily implied by the structure of the Amend-
ment. The right to defend is given directly to the
accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if
the defense fails ..... An unwanted counsel 'repre-
sents' the defendant only through a tenuous and
unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has
acquiesced in such representation, the defense
presented is not the defense guaranteed him by
the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not
his defense. 97
96 422 U.S.Faretta, supra note 13, at 817.
97 Id. at 819-21 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). A similar point is
made later in the opinion:
The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his
lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a
conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free
personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to
his advantage.
Id. at 834 (emphasis added). The emphasized wording in the opinion about
the defendant being the one who suffers the consequences of a failed defense
(and should therefore be given the right to choose between representation or
no representation) is central to the Court's reliance upon the notion of au-
tonomy to justify the right. Yet, ironically, there are some courts that view
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Having concluded that "[t]he Sixth Amendment, when natu-
rally read, implies a right of self-representation,"98 the Court
found further support for its conclusion in English common law,
many colonial charters and declarations of rights, and federal
legislation.99
The entirety of the Court's comments on what sort of warn-
ings need to be administered to a defendant requesting leave to
appear pro se appears in the following paragraph of the opinion:
When an accused manages his own defense, he re-
linquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the
traditional benefits associated with the right to
counsel. For this reason, in order to represent him-
self, the accused must 'knowingly and intelligently'
forgo those relinquished benefits. [citing Johnson
v. Zerbst]... Although a defendant need not him-
self have the skill and experience of a lawyer in
order competently and intelligently to choose self-
representation, he should be made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,
so that the record will establish that 'he knows
what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open.' [citing Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann].. .100
Justice Blackmun, dissenting on various grounds, pointed to
future "procedural problems"'' 1 he thought would arise from
the majority's recognition of a Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation:
sentencing post-Faretta as a stage in which defendants have - by virtue of
their guilty plea or conviction at trial - lost their autonomy; therefore, they
reason that courts may impose unwanted counsel on them as standby coun-
sel, amicus counsel, or independent counsel to assist them, or to present miti-
gating evidence when they refuse to do so.
98 Id. at 821.
99 Id. at 821-31.
100 Id. at 835.
101 Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Must every defendant be advised of his right to
proceed pro se? If so, when must that notice be
given? Since the right to assistance of counsel and
the right to self-representation are mutually exclu-
sive, how is the waiver of each right to be mea-
sured? If a defendant has elected to exercise his
right to proceed pro se, does he still have a consti-
tutional right to assistance of standby counsel?
How soon in the criminal proceeding must a de-
fendant decide between proceeding by counsel or
pro se? Must he be allowed to switch in midtrial?
May a violation of the right to self-representation
ever be harmless error? Must the trial court treat
the pro se defendant differently than it would pro-
fessional counsel?102
While Justice Blackmun's procedural concerns include the is-
sue of whether a pro se defendant may "switch in midtrial," they
do not include the questions with which we are concerned here,
namely: Does the court have a duty to readmonish a pro se de-
fendant after trial that he has the right to counsel at sentencing?,
and, Does the court have a presumptive duty to reappoint coun-
sel upon a pro se defendant's request at sentencing?
An examination of the current Benchbook for U.S. District
Court Judges 03 reveals that "assignment of counsel should be
the first item of business before the judge" at the defendant's
first appearance. 104 Then, if the defendant does not appear by
counsel, the court must inform the defendant "of his or her con-
stitutional right to be represented by an attorney at every stage
of the proceedings.'' 10 5 If the defendant does not want counsel,
his waiver must be "knowing and voluntary. This means that
102 Id.
103 BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES (SIXTH) § 1.02, at
11(Sixth Ed.) (March, 5-8 (2013).
104 Id. at § 1.02, at 5.
105 Id. atSupra note 103, § 1.02(A)(1)(a), at 5 (emphasis added).
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you must make clear on the record that the defendant is fully
aware of the hazards and disadvantages of self-representa-
tion."106 The Benchbook then lists the recommended questions
to be posed in what has come to be known as a Faretta
hearing.' 07
106 Id. atSupra note 103, § 1.02(C), at 6.
107 The questions are:
1. Have you ever studied law?
2. Have you ever represented yourself in a criminal action?
3. Do you understand that you are charged with these crimes:
[state the crimes with which the defendant is charged]?
4. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of the crime charged in
Count I, the court must impose a special assessment of $100 and could
sentence you to years in prison, impose a term of supervised release that
follows imprisonment, fine you and direct you to pay restitution?
[Ask the defendant a similar question for each crime charged in the indict-
ment or information.]
5. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of more than one of
these crimes, this court can order that the sentences be served consecu-
tively, that is, one after another?
6. Do you understand that there are advisory Sentencing Guidelines that
may have an effect on your sentence if you are found guilty?
7. Do you understand that if you represent yourself, you are on your own?
I cannot tell you or even advise you how you should try your case.
8. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence?
9. Do you understand that the rules of evidence govern what evidence
may or may not be introduced at trial, that in representing yourself, you
must abide by those very technical rules, and that they will not be relaxed
for your benefit?
10. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure?
11. Do you understand that those rules govern the way a criminal action is
tried in federal court, that you are bound by those rules, and that they will
not be relaxed for your benefit?
[Then say to the defendant something to this effect:]
12. I must advise you that in my opinion, a trained lawyer would defend
you far better than you could defend yourself. I think it is unwise of you to
try to represent yourself. You are not familiar with the law. You are not
familiar with court procedure.
You are not familiar with the rules of evidence. I strongly urge you not to
try to represent yourself.
13. Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if you are found
guilty, and in light of all of the difficulties of representing yourself, do you
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Two of the recommended questions pertain to sentencing:
"Do you understand that if you are found guilty of more than
one of these crimes, this court can order that the sentences be
served consecutively, that is, one after another?", and, "Do you
understand that there are advisory Sentencing Guidelines that
may have an effect on your sentence if you are found guilty?"
Interestingly, while judges are required to advise defendants
they have a right to counsel "at every stage of the proceedings,"
there are neither recommendations provided in the Benchbook
for the situation discussed here in which a pro se defendant is
found (or pleads) guilty, nor whether he court should readmon-
ish the defendant of his right to counsel at that stage.
C. Post-Faretta Developments
The Supreme Court in Patterson v. Illinois adopted a so-called
"pragmatic approach" to the issue of adequacy of warnings re-
garding the right to counsel.108 There, the defendant gave a
post-indictment statement to the police in a conversation they
had initiated before an attorney was assigned to him and after
he was properly Mirandized.10 9 The Court rejected the defen-
dant's claim that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was vio-
lated because the Miranda warnings he received were not
sufficient to waive Sixth Amendment rights: 110
still desire to represent yourself and to give up your right to be represented
by a lawyer?
14. Is your decision entirely voluntary?
[If the answers to the two preceding questions are yes, say something to
the following effect:]
15. I find that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived the
right to counsel. I will therefore permit the defendant to represent himself
[herself].
Id. § 1.02(C), at 6-7.
108 Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 288298 (1988).
109 Id. at 298.
110 Id. at 297-98.
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[W]e have never suggested that one right is "supe-
rior" or "greater" than the other, nor is there any
support in our cases for the notion that because a
Sixth Amendment right may be involved, it is
more difficult to waive than the Fifth Amendment
counterpart.
Instead, we have taken a more pragmatic ap-
proach to the waiver question-asking what pur-
poses a lawyer can serve at the particular stage of
the proceedings in question, and what assistance
he could provide to an accused at that stage-to
determine the scope of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, and the type of warnings and pro-
cedures that should be required before a waiver of
that right will be recognized.1
The Court found that whatever warnings suffice under Mi-
randa are also adequate for a Sixth Amendment waiver of coun-
sel.112 Commencing formal adversarial proceedings against the
defendant "does not substantially increase the value of counsel
to the accused at questioning, or expand the limited purpose
that an attorney serves when the accused is questioned by au-
thorities. . . [W]e do not discern a substantial difference be-
tween the usefulness of a lawyer to a suspect during custodial
interrogation, and his value to an accused at post indictment
questioning."1 13
The "pragmatic approach" was utilized to clarify the constitu-
tionally minimum Faretta warnings to be given pro se defend-
ants in the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Iowa v.
Tovar, involving a defendant who entered a plea of guilty pro
11 Id. at 298. The Court cited United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), one
of the few cases in which a particular stage in the prosecution (post-indict-
ment photographic display) was found not to be sufficiently critical to war-
rant a right to counsel).
112 487 U.SPatterson, supra note 108, at 298.
113 Id. at 298-99.
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se. 114 The defendant signed a form waiving his right to counsel
during his initial interrogation about his Operating Motor Vehi-
cle While Intoxicated (OWI) charge, and then orally waived ap-
pointment of counsel at his first appearance.' 1 5 After a colloquy
regarding waiver of his rights to counsel and various trial rights,
he was advised of the maximum penalty for the charge and then
pled guilty.'1 6 He later appeared at a sentencing hearing on the
OWI charge, as well as a later driving while license suspended
charge, during which the trial court engaged in a similar collo-
quy and imposed a sentence for the offense." 7 About two years
later Tovar then pled guilty with counsel to a second OWI
charge. 8 Finally, about two and one-half years later Tovar was
again charged with a third OWI charge that, if proven, would
constitute a felony. 119
Defense counsel argued that the first OWI conviction could
not be used to enhance the third charge because Tovar's waiver
in the first case was not made knowingly, intelligently, and vol-
untarily. Specifically, the defendant claimed the court did not
make him aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-repre-
sentation.12 0 The court denied the motion on grounds that the
Faretta warnings did not need to be more detailed because the
crime was "readily understood by laypersons" and the penalty
was "not unduly severe."' 21 The Iowa Court of Appeals af-
firmed, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed.122 That court
held that, while the dangers of proceeding pro se at a guilty plea
114 Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80 (2004).
115 Id. at 82.
116 Id. at 82-84.
117 Id. at 84.
118 Id. at 85.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 8685.
121 Id. Presumably, the trial court cited the Patterson case in support of its
ruling, but the Court's opinion is silent on this point.
122 Id.
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are different than the dangers of doing so at trial, the inquiries
will also be different. 23
The Tovar Court described the new "pragmatic" approach an-
nounced in Patterson as one that asks "what purposes a lawyer
can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in question,
and what assistance he could provide to an accused at that
stage" in order to determine "the scope of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, and the type of warnings and procedures
that should be required before a waiver of that right will be rec-
ognized. ' 124 Specifically, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the
colloquy in the first case was constitutionally inadequate be-
cause he should not only should have been advised of the useful-
ness of an attorney and the dangers of self-representation. But
he also should have been told that "there are defenses to crimi-
nal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the
danger in waiving assistance of counsel in deciding whether the
plead guilty is the is that a viable defense will be overlooked."
He should have been told that, by waiving counsel, he will "lose
the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether,
under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty.' 125
In reversing the Iowa Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme
Court applied Patterson and struck down the two aforemen-
tioned admonitions (i.e., without counsel defenses may be over-
looked, and an opportunity will be lost to get an independent
opinion regarding the wisdom of entering guilty plea) as consti-
tutionally unnecessary. 126 The Court reasoned that,
[I]t is far from clear that the warnings of the kind
required by the Iowa Supreme Court would have
enlightened Tovar's decision whether to seek
counsel or represent himself.. . [T]he admonitions
123 Id.
124 Id. at 90. Note that this is the same test for determining whether a partic-
ular stage in the prosecution in "critical." See infra Part 11(A).
125 Id. at 86-87-88.
126 Id. at 94.
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at issue might confuse or mislead a defendant
more than they would inform him... [They] might
be misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that a meri-
torious defense exists or that the defendant could
plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a
realistic one... [and] the prompt disposition of the
case will be impeded" and the resources of the
state or defendant will be wasted.127
The Court in Iowa v. Tovar, narrowed the Faretta inquiry, re-
lying on the language in Patterson to the effect that the prag-
matic approach asks "what purposes a lawyer can serve at the
particular stage of the proceedings in question, and what assis-
tance he could provide to an accused at that stage."128 The Court
found a "less searching inquiry" than required at trial, like the
post-indictment questioning in Patterson, is required at a guilty
plea hearing.129
The reasoning of Tovar in limiting the Faretta colloquy should
of course not be applied to the sentencing context. Sentencing
is far more complex and significant than the guilty plea hearing,
or the trial itself, requiring that pro se defendants' request for
counsel after trial be presumptively honored. This principle was
recognized but not addressed by the Supreme Court in
Grandison v. Maryland, an opinion denying a petition for certio-
rari, which concerned the reappointment of counsel issue dis-
cussed here.130 This was a capital case in which the defendant
presented two issues, one of which was whether the state trial
127 Id. at 9893. See Jona Goldschmidt, Ensuring Fairness or Just Cluttering
up the Colloquy? Toward Recognition of Pro Se Defendants' Right to be In-
formed ofAvailable Defenses, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 667, 703-13 (2013) (criticiz-
ing Iowa v. Tovar on multiple grounds, and arguing for restoration of pro se
defendants' right to be informed of available defenses before entry of a guilty
plea or trial).
128 541 U.S.Supra note 114, at 8990, quoting Patterson, 487 U.S.supra note
108, at 298.
129 Id.
130 Grandison v. Maryland, 479 U.S. 873 (1986).
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court erred in denying his request that his former standby coun-
sel be appointed counsel at "the first scheduled sentencing pro-
ceeding."1 31 The trial court refused the request on grounds that
it was untimely made, and once the decision to self-represent is
made, "the request to change rests solely within the discretion of
the trial court."1 32
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote an opinion
dissenting from the Court's denial of certiorari in which he con-
cluded that the refusal to appoint counsel at sentencing "de-
prived petitioner of his constitutional right to be represented
during his sentencing hearing."1 33 Justice Thurgood wrote:
Assuming for the sake of argument that in a non
bifurcated criminal proceeding a trial judge could
in some circumstances deny a defendant who ini-
tially asserted his right to represent himself the
right to later change his mind and proceed with
counsel, such a rule would not imply that a waiver
of counsel in the guilt phase of a capital proceed-
ing requires a defendant to proceed pro se, against
his will, in the sentencing phase. The Maryland
Court of Appeals cursorily dismissed petitioner's
claim that, because capital sentencing constituted
a separate trial, he was entitled to make a new de-
cision about whether he wanted counsel or not....
I find this claim worthy of considerably more at-
tention than the Maryland court gave it.134
The opinion cited to previous Supreme Court language refer-
ring to sentencing (for double jeopardy clause purposes) as a
separate trial: "'the presentence hearing resembled and, indeed,
in all relevant respects was like the immediately preceding trial
on the issue of guilt or innocence. It was itself a trial on the
131 Id. at 874.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 876.
134 Id. at 875.
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issue of punishment'.," 35 The dissent also cited Maryland stat-
utes indicating sentencing is considered "a separate trial" on the
issue of punishment, concluding,
The waiver of the right to counsel at the first
"trial" on guilt or innocence should therefore have
no more bearing on a defendant's right to counsel
in the sentencing phase than it would on that de-
fendant's right to counsel in a separate trial on re-
lated crimes. It should under no circumstances
irrevocably bind a defendant in the sentencing
phase.
The trial court articulated no basis for refusing pe-
titioner's request to appoint counsel. Even at mid-
trial in a non-bifurcated proceeding, a trial court's
unexplained refusal to permit a defendant to re-
voke his assertion of the right to self-representa-
tion would surely constitute an abuse of
discretion. A trial court cannot insist that a defen-
dant continue representing himself out of some pu-
nitive notion that that defendant, having made his
bed, should be compelled to lie in it. Yet in this
case, where petitioner's right to counsel was trig-
gered anew by the start of a new trial on the issue
of punishment, the trial court refused, entirely
without justification, to permit him to assert that
right to counsel. This refusal deprived petitioner
of his constitutional right to be represented during
his sentencing hearing.1 36
There was a time at common law when sentencing was consid-
ered an inexorable part of the criminal trial.
Our modern expectation is that sentencing will oc-
cur in a separate post-verdict phase, after the trial
135 Id., quoting Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981).
136 Id. at 876 (emphasis added).
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has determined guilt. Furthermore, in jury-tried
cases, we expect the judge, not the jury, to exer-
cise whatever sentencing discretion the law might
bestow. In early modern times, however, these di-
visions of functions in sentencing matters between
trial and post-trial, and between jury and judge,
were less distinct . . . Only a small fraction of
eighteenth-century criminal trial were genuinely
contested inquiries into guilt or innocence. . . . To
the extent that trial had a function in such cases
beyond formalizing the inevitable conclusion of
guilt, it was to decide the sanction... [T]he main
purpose of defending such a case was to present
the jury with a sympathetic view of the offender
and the circumstances of the crime that would en-
courage a verdict of mitigation ... By structuring
sentencing as an incident of the trial, the proce-
dure foreclosed the defendant from participating
in what was in function his sentencing hearing un-
less he spoke about the circumstances of the
offense.137
Unfortunately, some courts still view the sentencing hearing
as an extension of the trial. This view is outdated given modern
sentencing law and practice.
III. SENTENCING: A CRITICAL STAGE OF THE PROSECUTION
A. Factors Determinative of a "Critical Stage"
Since the Supreme Court of the United States decided
Mempa v. Rhay 138 in 1967, sentencing has been considered a
"critical stage" of the criminal prosecution process to which the
Volume 8, Number 2
137 LANGBEIN, Adversary Trial, supra note 21, at 58-59.
138 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
.Spring 2015
35
Goldschmidt: Has He "Made His Bed, and Now Must Lie in It"?  Toward Recognitio
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 522
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.139 That case in-
volved a defendant who was represented at his guilty plea hear-
ing, but appeared pro se at his probation revocation hearing,
which resulted in a revocation and a substantial prison term. The
presiding judge had failed to ask the defendant about his former
attorney, and whether he wished counsel to be appointed.140 The
denial of counsel was held to be a Sixth Amendment right-to-
counsel violation.141 The Court held that sentencing was a criti-
cal stage of the prosecution for which counsel was a matter of
Sixth Amendment right because "appointment of counsel for an
indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding
where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be af-
fected,"142 and because "the necessity for the aid of counsel in
marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circum-
stances and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to pre-
sent his case as to sentence is apparent.' '143
Mempa v. Rhay was preceded and followed by many other
decisions in which the Court found that the right to counsel at-
tached because the stage of the prosecution in which the issue
arose was a "critical" one. The earlier decision in Townsend v.
Burke involved a similar situation of a defendant who was rep-
resented at a plea hearing, but not at a later sentencing.144 In
finding a Sixth Amendment violation, the Court pointed out:
[C]ounsel might not have changed the sentence,
but he could have taken steps to see that the con-
viction and sentence were not predicated on mis-
139 Three years later the Court defined a "stage" in the prosecution not so
much as a point in time, but as an "event" in the course of the prosecution
that may occur at pretrial, trial, or post-trial. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1, 17 (1970) (White, J., concurring) ("[R]ecent cases furnish ample ground for
holding the preliminary hearing a critical event in the progress of a criminal
case.").
140 389 U.S. at 130.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 134.
143 Id. at 135
144 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 738 (1948).
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information or misreading of court records, a
requirement of fair play which absence of counsel
withheld from this prisoner.145
Where a trial court sentences a defendant to death based in
part on confidential information that is not disclosed to him or
defense counsel, the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner v.
Florida held that the defendant is denied due process. 146 The
Court in that case stated;
[I]t is now clear that the sentencing process, as
well as the trial itself, must satisfy the require-
ments of the Due Process Clause . . . [T]he sen-
tencing is a critical stage of the criminal
proceeding at which he is entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel. 14 7
The factors which constitute a critical stage of the prosecution
vary depending upon the stage in question. In appeals, the law-
yer for the defendant acts "as a shield to protect him against
being 'haled into court by the State and stripped of his presump-
tion of innocence'. '"148 When a post-indictment lineup was found
in United States v. Wade to constitute a critical stage, the Court
held that the right to counsel attaches at post-indictment lineups
because "the results might well settle the accused's fate and re-
duce the trial to a mere formality." 149 A lawyer's presence dur-
ing a post-indictment lineup is necessary, the Court said,
145 Id. at 741. References to the broad spectrum of critical stages can be
found in the Court's statements in Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 160
(1957)("The right to counsel is not a right confined to representation during
the trial on the merits."), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977)
(The right to counsel "means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a
lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated
against him ... ").
146 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
147 Id. at 358.
148 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1975) (refusing to find discretionary
appeals to be a critical stage).
149 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 224.
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because "the confrontation compelled by the State between the
accused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identifi-
cation evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers
and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, dero-
gate from a fair trial.150 A lawyer will be able to object to "the
degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prose-
cution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identifica-
tion,"151 "be alert for conditions prejudicial to the suspect," 152
and be able to bring such matters to the attention of the jury,
instead of allowing the jury to choose between "the accused's
unsupported version and that of the police officers present."' 53
The reason for finding an arraignment to be a critical stage in
Hamilton v. State of Alabama was that "[a]vailable defenses may
be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted" (as required
by state law).154 The Court also quoted from a previous decision
regarding the need for what Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Ala-
bama155 had called the "guiding hand of counsel". The guiding
hand of counsel is needed at the trial "'lest the unwary concede
that which only bewilderment or ignorance could justify or pay a
penalty which is greater than the law of the State exacts for the
offense which they in fact and in law committed'.," 56 In Hamil-
ton the Court noted that the prejudice from lack of counsel "can
never be known. Only the presence of counsel could have ena-
150 Id. at 228.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 230.
153 Id. at 231.
154 368 U.S. 52,Hamilton, supra note 50, at 54 (1961)..
155 287 U.S. 45,Powell, supra note 31, at 69 (1932)..
156 368 U.S.Hamilton, supra note 50, at 159154-55, quoting Tompkins v.
State of Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 489 (1945) (reversing conviction where court
failed to appoint counsel in a capital case, and defendant was ignorant of his
right to request counsel). The same result as in Tompkins should obtain
where, as argued here, a pro se defendant is convicted and at trial (or a plea)
and proceeds to sentencing without proper admonishment of the continuing
right to counsel.
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bled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and
to plead intelligently. '"157
In finding preliminary hearings as being critical stages, the
Court in Coleman v. Alabama described the advantages of hav-
ing counsel as follows:
The determination whether the hearing is a 'criti-
cal stage' requiring the provision of counsel de-
pends, as noted, upon an analysis 'whether
potential substantial prejudice to defendant's
rights inheres in the.., confrontation and the abil-
ity of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.' . . .
Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the prelimi-
nary hearing is essential to protect the indigent ac-
cused against an erroneous or improper
prosecution. First, the lawyer's skilled examina-
tion and cross-examination of witnesses may ex-
pose fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may
lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused
over. Second, in any event, the skilled interroga-
tion of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can
fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-
examination of the State's witnesses at the trial, or
preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a
witness who does not appear at the trial. Third,
trained counsel can more effectively discover the
case the State has against his client and make pos-
sible the preparation of a proper defense to meet
that case at the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be
influential at the preliminary hearing in making ef-
fective arguments for the accused on such matters
as the necessity for an early psychiatric examina-
tion or bail.158
157 369 U.SId. at 159155.
158 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 8 (1970). Similar descriptions of the
value of defense counsel can be found in the decisions holding that post-
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Lawyers at sentencing perform many of these same functions,
and more.159 The authors of a recognized sentencing practice
manual characterize the significance of the sentencing stage this
way:
The vast majority of cases not dismissed ultimately
result in conviction, either after trial or as a result
of a negotiated plea. That fact makes sentencing
the most critical stage of a criminal prosecution,
and the proceeding having the greatest personal
arraignment interviews by law enforcement officers, Patterson v. Illinois, 487
U.S. 285 (1988); preliminary hearings, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963)
(per curiam); plea hearings, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); ap-
peals, Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); overnights between court sessions,
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); post-indictment eavesdropping by
the prosecution, Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); and psychiatric com-
petency examinations, Estelle v. United States, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), Satter-
white v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988), are critical stages of a prosecution. See
also, Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 180 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the
first critical stage in a capital case is "the series of pretrial meetings between
the accused and his counsel when they decide how the case should be de-
fended" where matters like conflicts of interest may surface). Cf. United
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (no right to counsel at post-indictment
photo display to witnesses); Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989) (no right to
counsel during 15-minute break during defendant's testimony). See also,
Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957) (finding due process violation where
state trial judge refused to permit prisoner to attend an evidentiary hearing
held for the purpose of "settlement" of contents of disputed trial transcript,
and refused to appoint counsel for him):
We cannot agree that petitioner's refusal to be represented by
counsel at the trial constituted a waiver of his right to counsel at
the settlement proceedings. Moreover, it is at least doubtful
whether, as a matter of due process, any such waiver would be
effective to relieve the trial judge of a duty to appoint counsel
for petitioner in connection with the settlement of this record,
which was a necessary and integral part of the compulsory ap-
peal provided by California in capital cases. We need not de-
cide that question, however, for the record fails to show that
petitioner ever waived his right to counsel in connection with
the settlement of the appellate record.
Id. at 162-63 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
159 See infra Part 111(B).
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impact on the defendant. For these reasons, coun-
sel should be aware of the sentencing ramifica-
tions as a matter of first priority in any case, long
before discovery, plea-bargaining, and trial
preparation. 160
Noteworthy is the preceding description of the sentencing
stage as, not just a "critical stage," but "the most critical stage"
of a criminal prosecution.61 We earlier saw how the right to
counsel is the most important of all civil rights, and now we un-
derstand that experts consider sentencing to be the most critical
stage of all stages of a criminal prosecution. Thus, if the court is
required to protect the rights of defendants so that they receive
a fair trial, and make counsel available at all critical stages, then
it stands to reason that trial judges will be expected to readmon-
ish pro se defendants of their right to counsel at sentencing.
160 3 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 102:2 (2010)
161 The authors of this manual in a later section state: "It is to be noted, at
the outset, that the first step toward assuring proper protection for the rights
to which defendant are entitled at sentencing is the recognition by defense
counsel that this may very well be the most important part of the entire pro-
ceeding." Id. at § 104.1. See also, United States v. Pinckney, 551 F2dF.2d
1241, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1976), an early, pre-guidelines decision in which Chief
Judge Bazelon wrote that sentencing "may well be the most important part of
the entire proceeding," Id. at 1249, and then set forth minimum duties for
defense counsel at sentencing. The court required that counsel (1)
"[f]amiliarize himself with all reports serving as a foundation for sentence
sufficiently in advance of the sentencing hearing, assuming access to such re-
ports at this time," and "present to the court any ground which will assist in
reaching a proper disposition favorable to the accused," (2) "be prepared to
present to the court all the factors and circumstances necessary to ensure "a
reasonably meaningful hearing on sentence," because it is essential in order
for trial judges to discharge their own duty "to maintain proper standards of
performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases
in their courts." Id. at 1250-51 (footnotes omitted).
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B. The Unique Criticality of the Sentencing Stage
Sentencing is not merely a critical stage. It is uniquely critical
because it most resembles a trial, unlike the other stages in the
prosecution that the Court has deemed to be "critical."
Reviewing the authorities previously discussed, we see that
each critical stage of the prosecution benefits from the presence
of defense counsel in different ways. In lineups, the lawyer's
presence is necessary to ensure that the process is not suggestive
because of the "innumerable dangers and variable factors"
which might affect a fair trial.162 A lawyer is necessary at an
arraignment to ensure the defendant is aware that there are
"available defenses [that] may be irretrievably lost" if not as-
serted.163 For preliminary hearings, counsel is necessary because
his skills of examination and cross-examination may persuade
the court not to bind the defendant over for trial, will assist the
lawyer in fashioning future "impeachment tool" in examining
the prosecution's witnesses at trial, to preserve favorable testi-
mony for use at trial, for discovery of the state's case, and to
make arguments on matters such as the need for a psychiatric
examination or bail.164 In misdemeanor cases, "[c]ounsel is
needed so that the accused may know precisely what he is doing,
so that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison,
and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution."165
Additional roles are played by counsel during long periods of
time between court sessions, as the Court noted in Geders v.
United States:
It is common practice during such recesses for an
accused and counsel to discuss the events of the
day's trial. Such recesses are often times of inten-
sive work, with tactical decisions to be made and
162 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 224.
163 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. at 54.
164 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. at 8.
165 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 34.
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strategies to be reviewed. The lawyer may need to
obtain from his client information made relevant
by the day's testimony, or he may need to pursue
inquiry along lines not fully explored earlier. At
the very least, the overnight recess during trial
gives the defendant a chance to discuss with coun-
sel the significance of the day's events. 166
The Court has also noted the importance of having counsel
present at a post-indictment confrontation between the defen-
dant and a co-defendant who is a police agent:
[T]he Court has also recognized that the assistance
of counsel cannot be limited to participation in a
trial; to deprive a person of counsel during the pe-
riod prior to trial may be more damaging than de-
nial of counsel during the trial itself. Recognizing
that the right to the assistance of counsel is shaped
by the need for the assistance of counsel, we have
found that the right attaches at earlier, "critical"
stages in the criminal justice process "where the
results might well settle the accused's fate and re-
duce the trial itself to a mere formality."
While the necessity of counsel is recognized in order that
these important pre-trial and post-indictment functions may be
fulfilled, the Supreme Court's comments about the role of coun-
sel in capital sentencing hearings is directly relevant to the issue
of the necessity of counsel at sentencing generally. Thus, in the
well-known decision in Furman v. Georgia the Court held that a
death sentence imposed by the State of Georgia violated the
Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual penalty clause because
of the arbitrary manner in which the sentence was imposed. 167
166 425 U.S. at 88.
167 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (citations omitted). As Justice Douglas, concur-
ring, noted,
[W]e know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing
the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied,
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In Georgia, the judge or jury had sole discretion to impose the
death penalty, causing the Court to note that "It would seem to
be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defen-
dant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his
race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed
under a procedure that gives room for the play of such
prejudices.'1 68
The Court thereafter decided Gregg v. Georgia, in which it
upheld a death sentence under a revised procedure in which a
bifurcated sentencing hearing was conducted after the trial; the
new procedure involved providing the sentence with a set of fac-
tors in mitigation and aggravation that suggested the appropri-
ateness of a death sentence in a particular case, or lack
thereof.1 69
It is certainly not a novel proposition that discre-
tion in the area of sentencing be exercised in an
informed manner. We have long recognized that
"(f)or the determination of sentences, justice gen-
feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and de-
spised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a
suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social
position may be in a more protected position .... We have, I
fear, taken in practice ... of making the death penalty discre-
tionary and partially as a result of the ability of the rich to
purchase the services of the most respected and most resource-
ful legal talent in the Nation.
And, as Justice Brennan noted in his concurrence:
In determining whether a punishment comports with human
dignity, we are aided also by a second principle inherent in the
Clause-that the State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe pun-
ishment. This principle derives from the notion that the State
does not respect human dignity when, without reason, it inflicts
upon some people a severe punishment that it does not inflict
upon others. Indeed, the very words 'cruel and unusual punish-
ments' imply condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe
punishments.
Id. at 274 (citations omitted). 
168 Id. at 242.
169 428 U.S. 153, 221-24 (1976).
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erally requires.., that there be taken into account
the circumstances of the offense together with the
character and propensities of the offender." . . .
Otherwise, "the system cannot function in a con-
sistent and a rational manner."' 170
The differences, as noted in Furman and Gregg, between the
trial process and sentencing are few; both proceedings require a
fair, non-arbitrary, and rational fact-gathering process, for which
counsel is critical.'17 At trial, counsel tests the state's case, and
affirmatively attempts to persuade the trier of fact of an availa-
ble defense. At sentencing, counsel challenges the introduction
of aggravating factors, and affirmatively offers whatever evi-
dence is available in mitigation. The same concerns for fairness
and rational decision making applies to both stages, which are
absent in the other critical stages discussed above. At trial, "ex-
ternal" facts are gathered to establish guilt or innocence, while
at sentencing "internal" facts surrounding the personal charac-
teristics of the defendant are gathered. Moreover, the inquiry
during the sentencing stage has greater consequences than a
trial, especially in capital cases, and certainly greater than those
resulting from other critical stages such as a motion to suppress,
a preliminary hearing, a recess during a trial, or any other stage
of the prosecution.
The necessity for post-trial readmonishment of the right to
counsel may not apply to most pro se defendants because most
170 Id. at 189 (citations omitted). As Justice Steward wrote for the majority:
If an experienced trial judge, who daily faces the difficult task
of imposing sentences, has a vital need for accurate information
about a defendant and the crime he committed in order to be
able to impose a rational sentence in the typical criminal case,
then accurate sentencing information is an indispensable pre-
requisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant
shall live or die by a jury of people who may never before have
made a sentencing decision.
Id. at 190.
171 See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980) (explaining that "height-
ened reliability" is required in the capital sentencing proceedings).
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judges already do so. In other cases, readmonishment occurs by
virtue of the requirement to conduct a Faretta hearing at every
critical stage. But, if one, or 20, or 200 pro se defendants receive
the benefit of readmonishment, followed by appointment of
counsel if requested, there will be that much less arbitrariness
and bias, and more fair and rational hearings which thoroughly
present the sentencer with all of the applicable factors and evi-
dence in mitigation. Felony cases should not be treated differ-
ently from capital cases, where bifurcated hearings are
constitutionally required, since the same need arises for rational,
non-arbitrary decisions in all sentencing decisions.
C. Sentencing Complexity and the Necessity of Counsel
In addition to the unique criticality of the right to counsel at
sentencing in so far as ensuring a fair and reliable hearing is the
sheer complexity of the sentencing process. Since the creation
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission 172 and the adoption of its
Sentencing Guidelines, 173 the complexity of federal sentencing
has surpassed that of the trial itself, such that defense counsel is
a necessity.
Instead of determining the defendant's guilt or innocence of
one or more crimes arising out of a criminal transaction, judges
must conduct a trial on punishment. Every sentencing involving
the use of the Sentencing Guidelines,
is virtually certain to involve a calculation of the
appropriate guidelines range, including the assign-
ment of criminal history points and the determina-
tion of a total offense level; the consideration of
whether to grant upward or downward departures
or variances; an analysis of the factors of 18 U.S.C.
172 28 U.S.C.A. § 991 et seq. (2008).
173 The Guidelines were authorized by the Sentencing Reform Act, a part of
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (1984), 28 U.S.C. § 994(a), et seq.
See generally, PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 157, at § 103:1.
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§ 3553(a); a consideration of whether the sentence
is reasonable; the application of mandatory mini-
mum or maximum statutes; or an argument that
the sentence is unconstitutional (e.g., cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment).174
As noted, judges first take a long list of statutory factors into
consideration. 75 They must also consult and be familiar with the
174 Duvall, suprainfra note 305, at 135.
175 The federal law is typical. The factors to consider by the court - and the
purposes to be served- by an appropriate sentence are set forth inl8 U.S.C.
§ 3553: (2010):
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.-The court shall im-
pose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with
the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in
determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and charac-
teristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational train-
ing, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for-
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable cate-
gory of defendant as set forth in the guidelines-
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of
title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such
guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments
have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amend-
ments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the appli-
cable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission
pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking into
account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by
act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be
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complicated labyrinth of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (or
equivalent state guidelines) themselves, which are known to be
complicated, lengthy and challenging to apply.
The guidelines have been in existence for some 20
years. They continue to be the source of great
controversy. They are also the basis of a mature,
although constantly changing body of law. There
are now hundreds of guideline amendments and
thousands of reported decisions applying the
guidelines. Every participant in the federal crimi-
nal justice system must be knowledgeable about
the guidelines and the applicable case law because
the guidelines affect every stage of the process, in-
cluding plea negotiations, trial strategy, sentenc-
ing, and appeals. 76
The Third Circuit commented on the complexity of sentencing
in United States v. Salemo.' 77 There, the court held that "sen-
tencing is a critical and often times complicated part of the crim-
inal process that contains subtleties which may be beyond the
appreciation of the average layperson seeking to represent him/
incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued
under section 994(p) of title 28);
(5) any pertinent policy statement-
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of
title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such pol-
icy statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments
have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amend-
ments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced.1
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
176 THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON, PETER B. HOFFMAN, DEBORAH YOUNG, AND
SIGMUND G. POPKO, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE: 2014 Edi-
tion v (2014).
177 United States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 1995).
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herself." 178 In ruling that the trial court erred in giving the de-
fendant pro se status without an adequate Faretta hearing, the
Salemo court stated:
We have... previously noted that "[t]he [Sentenc-
ing] Guidelines contain a complex procedure for
determining the appropriate increase in offense
level for conviction of multiple counts." . . . ("The
guidelines . . . have created a complex
hypertechnical system consuming great amounts
of judicial time for both trial and appellate
judges."). Commentators have also bemoaned the
complexities of our sentencing system... (citing
articles that "call attention to the frustrations of
lawyers, judges and probation officers who must
try to understand the complexities of the [sentenc-
ing] system").
Indeed, in some cases, one's ultimate fate is deter-
mined more by the application of the Guidelines
than the determination of innocence or guilt. For
example, sentencing judges are not limited to a
consideration of the specific conduct that consti-
tutes the offense of conviction in determining
whether a given offense characteristic applies.
Under USSG § 1B1.3, a judge generally must con-
sider all "relevant conduct." Thus, "[t]he Guide-
lines are clear that conduct beyond the precise
acts of the offense of conviction may be used to
determine specific offense characteristics." .
Given these intricacies, it is particularly important
that a sentencing court be certain that a defendant
understands the perilous path he/she is going
down in attempting to proceed to sentencing with-
out the benefit of counsel.
178 Id. at 220.
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In addition, a defendant who is unfamiliar with the
post conviction process may inadvertently waive a
meritorious argument that he/she might otherwise
have raised on appeal. Thus, at sentencing, just as
at trial, "a defendant's waiver of counsel can be
deemed effective only where the district court has
made a searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy him[/
her] that the defendant's waiver was understand-
ing and voluntary."179
Beyond their inherent complexity is the procedure now re-
quired by the Supreme Court whenever sentencing guidelines
are used to justify an enhanced sentence, or upward departure,
from a stated penalty range. In Blakely v. Washington,'80 the Su-
preme Court held that facts on which a judge bases a decision to
sentence a defendant beyond state law sentencing guidelinesi 81
must be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt:
This case requires us to apply the rule we ex-
pressed in Apprendi v. New Jersey ... .: "Other
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre-
scribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
This rule reflects two longstanding tenets of com-
mon-law criminal jurisprudence: that the "truth of
179 Id. at 221 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also, United States v.
Yagow, 953 F.2d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 833 (1992)
(describing the sentencing guidelines as complex, confusing, and "almost
incomprehensible.").
180 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
181 Roughly 21 states use sentencing guidelines similar to the federal model.
See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES: PROFILES AND Continuum 4 (July, 2008), available at http://www.goo
gle.com/url?sa=t&rct=j &q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=l&ved=0CCAQFj
AA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncsc.org%2F-%2Fmedia%2FMicrosites
%2FFiles%2FCSI %2FStateSentencingGuidelines.ashx&ei=GvLDVOrwJs
2tyASp3oDICA&usg=AFQjCNGiGbV004MJ9QclQlbcxnb7Xz3Q-Q&bvm
=bv.84349003,d.aWw (last visited January 24, 2015).
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every accusation" against a defendant "should af-
terwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage
of twelve of his equals and neighbours,". . . , and
that "an accusation which lacks any particular fact
which the law makes essential to the punishment
is... no accusation within the requirements of the
common law, and it is no accusation in reason,"
... These principles have been acknowledged by
courts and treatises since the earliest days of grad-
uated sentencing . .. 182
The Blakely Court found that "[t]he facts supporting that
finding were neither admitted by petitioner nor found by a
jury."183 The Court concluded:
Petitioner was sentenced to prison for more than
three years beyond what the law allowed for the
crime to which he confessed, on the basis of a dis-
puted finding that he had acted with "deliberate
cruelty." The Framers would not have thought it
too much to demand that, before depriving a man
of three more years of his liberty, the State should
suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its
accusation to "the unanimous suffrage of twelve of
his equals and neighbours," . rather than a lone
employee of the State.18 4
Blakely was followed by United States v. Booker,185 which ex-
tended the same principle to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
making them (and their state counterparts) merely advisory.18 6
182 ld.Blakely, supra note 169, at 302301 (citations omitted).
183 Id. at 303302.
184 Id. at 313-14 (citations omitted).
185 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
186 See William H. Danne, Jr., Comment Note: Construction and Application
of United States Supreme Court Holding of U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125
S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), Rendering U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Advisory, 10 A.L.R. FED.2D 1 (2006).
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The relevance of these rulings for the readmonishment and re-
appointment of counsel issue is that sentencing complexity has
substantially increased. Whenever the prosecution seeks a sen-
tence greater than that dictated by a sentencing guideline, a jury
trial will be necessary to find the facts upon which such depar-
ture must be based. Not all defendants (pro se or represented)
are aware that after their jury trial on the issue of guilt or inno-
cence, they potentially face another jury trial at sentencing.
Not only is sentencing now more complex than in the past, the
Supreme Court has recently broadened the scope of resentenc-
ing hearings that may be required due to appellate reversals. In
2011 the Supreme Court in Pepper v. United States considered a
case in which a trial judge, upon resentencing following an ap-
pellate reversal, refused to consider circumstances surrounding
the defendant's rehabilitation that arose since the time of the
first sentencing.187 The Court held that the judge should have
considered such information when imposing the sentence. 188 In
its reasoning, the Court noted that sentences are based on the
principle that a sentence should fit the offender and not just the
crime, that Congress placed no limitations on the facts and cir-
cumstances a court may consider in fashioning an appropriate
sentence, that the court has wide discretion to consider all rele-
vant facts, and that the "history and characteristics" of the of-
fender should be taken into consideration in sentencing.189
Therefore, the breadth of the facts and circumstances a court
must take into account may in some cases make the sentencing
hearing longer and more complex than the trial itself, where the
issue is solely guilt or innocence. The defendant's "history and
characteristics" may need to be established through more wit-
nesses than were necessary at trial, including the possible use of
experts (e.g., sentencing mitigation experts, psychologists, social
workers, etc.) who may not have been needed at trial. Conse-
187 Pepper v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 1229 (2011).
188 Id. at 1243.
189 Id. at 1240-42.
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quently, pro se defendants who are not aware of the scope and
complexity of sentencing are entitled to know after trial that
they may re-invoke their right to counsel to assist them in the
sentencing stage.
Representation at sentencing requires the mind of
a technician, the skill of a mathematician, the intu-
ition of a social worker, and the eloquence of an
advocate. The technician must be familiar with
the statutes that set the penalty range, the provi-
sions for mandatory maximums or minimums, the
enhancement provisions that tack additional time
onto a sentence, and the sentencing guidelines
that have been adopted in many jurisdictions. In a
sentencing guidelines system, the mathematician
needs to calculate the offense level, decreases for
certain factors and increases for others, and a
criminal history score, while in a non-guidelines
system, the mathematician figures and refigures
numbers to account for the various counts and en-
hancements. The social worker focuses on the
particular characteristics of the defendant as they
may play into the sentencing process-substance
abuse that may warrant some form of treatment or
a financial status that may affect the ability to pay
restitution. The advocate, whose role subsumes all
of the above, presses for the best possible result
within whatever immutable confines exist.190
190 PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 157, § 102:1, at 102-3. That's not all:
The attorney must learn the answers to a number of discrete
questions and analyze the interplay of the various answers to
those questions. Will sentencing guidelines or a mandatory
minimum tie the judge's hands? Are there special enhance-
ment provisions that would apply, e.g., for repeat offenses or
for offenses committed while on release? Will a dismissal of
certain charges in exchange for a plea actually result in a lesser
sentence, or would the dismissed charges merge upon convic-
tion anyway? Will the uncharged conduct be proven at a sen-
Volume 8, Number 2 Spring 2015
53
Goldschmidt: Has He "Made His Bed, and Now Must Lie in It"?  Toward Recognitio
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 5+0
If pro se defendants were warned of the dangers and disad-
vantages of self-representation at sentencing, they would be un-
likely to refuse the appointment (or reappointment) of counsel.
There have, however, been cases of pro se defendants who not
only refused counsel, but also refused to present any evidence
in mitigation at their sentencing.
D. Pro Se Defendants' Refusal to Present
Mitigating Evidence
The importance of counsel at sentencing cannot be denied.
Often, the recognition is reflected in case law involving pro se
defendants, or even some represented defendants, who refuse to
introduce, or allow their attorneys to introduce, evidence in mit-
igation of their crime at sentencing. This phenomenon is prob-
lematic for courts, especially in capital cases where juries are
entitled to be presented with evidence both in aggravation and
in mitigation.191
tencing hearing, and what will the burden of proof be? Can the
judge enhance the sentence on the basis of an exclusive record
of arrests but few convictions? Is the client eligible for diver-
sion or for special sentencing as a youthful offender or as a
narcotics addict? Is restitution statutorily required and just
what remuneration is due the "victim"?
Id.
191 Cf. Raulerson v. Wainright, 469 U.S. 966, 969-70 (1984), an example of a
case in which no mitigation evidence was presented due to the trial judge's
rulings, not the defendant's refusal. This is an opinion by Justice Brennan
dissenting to the Court's denial of certiorari in a case in which he argued the
defendant had made an unequivocal demand to proceed pro se at a resen-
tencing hearing, but whose request was improperly denied without a Faretta
hearing by the state trial judge. Id. at 969. Most relevant here is the fact that
the defendant had expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney before this re-
sentencing hearing, and the trial court denied counsel's motion to withdraw,
and prohibited defendant from acting as co-counsel (after previously advising
him that he could). Id. at 967. "As a result, no argument against the death
penalty was presented on Raulerson's behalf." Id. at 968 (emphasis in
original).
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This entitlement was recognized by the Supreme Court in its
1990 decision in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, in which a repre-
sented defendant did not allow any mitigating evidence to be
introduced at his trial.192 At the time, Pennsylvania's death pen-
alty statute provided that "[t]he verdict must be a sentence of
death if the jury unanimously finds at least one or more aggra-
vating circumstances ... and no mitigating circumstances[,] or if
the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circum-
stances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances.",93 The is-
sue presented was whether the mandatory aspect of the statute
renders the defendant's capital sentence unconstitutional be-
cause it "improperly limited the discretion of the jury in decid-
ing the appropriate penalty for the crime."194 The Court found it
did not, and affirmed the conviction.195
The Blystone majority first acknowledged its prior decisions
holding that death penalty statutes must permit a jury to con-
sider all relevant evidence, regarding not only why a death sen-
tence should be imposed, but also why it should not be
imposed.,' 96 The jury must also be permitted to consider all rele-
vant facets of the character and record of the offender or the
circumstances of the offense, 197 and must consider, as a mitigat-
ing factor, any aspect of the defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant prof-
fers as a basis for a sentence less than death.198 The Court found
the Pennsylvania statute constitutional, noting that in the list of
192 Blystone v. Pennsylvania 494 U.S. 299, 306, n. 4 (1990).
193 Id. at 302 (emphasis added), citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv)
(1988). The petitioner challenged the mandatory nature of this language on
several grounds, not relevant here.
194 Id. at 303.
195 Id.
196 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976). See also, Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) ("[T]he sentence in capital cases must be permitted
to consider any relevant mitigating factor ... ").
197 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion).
198 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). The Court also cited Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989), for this proposition.
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statutory mitigating factors there existed a "catch-all" category:
"[a]ny other evidence of mitigation concerning the character
and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his of-
fense."'199 In addition, the jury had been instructed that it may
consider any mitigating evidence presented at trial, "including
that presented by either side during the guilt phase of the pro-
ceedings."200 "This was sufficient to satisfy the dictates of the
Eighth Amendment. 201 In sum, both the statute and the jury
instructions sufficed under the Eighth Amendment to provide
the jury with mitigating factors, even without the presentation of
mitigating evidence as such. 20 2
Having defined the jury's role in capital cases to include an
entitlement to mitigating evidence, the Court then decided
Schriro v. Landrigran, involving a Sixth Amendment ineffective-
199 494 United States v. Blystone, supra note 181, at 305.
200 Id. at 306, n. 4.
201 Id. at 308.
202 The requirement of individualized sentencing through the introduction of
both mitigating and aggravating factors also furthers our fundamental socie-
tal values:
If the sentencer is to make an individualized assessment of the
appropriateness of the death penalty, evidence about the de-
fendant's background and character is relevant because of the
belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit
criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged back-
ground, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less cul-
pable than defendants who have no such excuse. Moreover,
Eddings makes clear that it is not enough simply to allow the
defendant to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer. The
sentencer must also be able to consider and give effect to that
evidence in imposing sentence. Only then can we be sure that
the sentencer has treated the defendant as a uniquely individ-
ual human being[ ] and has made a reliable determination that
death is the appropriate sentence. Thus, the sentence imposed
at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to
the defendant's background, character, and crime.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). See also, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193, 206-07 (1976) (hold-
ing that valid capital sentencing statutes must include a requirement that mit-
igating evidence be offered).
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ness-of-counsel claim by a capital defendant. The defendant had
instructed his attorney to not present any evidence in mitigation
at his sentencing hearing, and then argued that his attorney was
ineffective by obeying his instructions.23 The Court held that
defense counsel was not ineffective when he failed to present
mitigating evidence based on specific instructions of his client.204
Thus, we know that the jury is entitled to mitigating evidence,
and that in the case of a represented defendant, counsel may
obey the client's instructions prohibiting introduction of such
evidence.
What about pro se defendants and their Sixth Amendment
right to self-representation? Does their Sixth Amendment right
to self-representation trump the jury's entitlement to mitigating
evidence under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, and the numerous Supreme Court deci-
sions interpreting the clause and establishing procedural obliga-
tions under it?
Lower courts encountering this problem have, not surpris-
ingly, appointed counsel to offer such evidence in these situa-
tions, even over the defendant's objection. 2 5 The New Jersey
Supreme Court in State v. Reddish, a pre-Schriro case, reversed
203 Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 478 (2007). See also, People v. Simp-
son, 792 N.E.2d 265, 285 (Ill. 2001) (holding appointed standby counsel in
capital case has no duty to prepare or present evidence in mitigation).
204 Id. at 480-91. The Court found that defendant had not satisfied the 2-
prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523-25 (2003) (finding counsel ineffective
for conducting unreasonable mitigation investigation); Porter v. McCollum,
558 U.S. 30, (standby counsel who became counsel at sentencing held ineffec-
tive for failing to engage in "some" sort of mitigation investigation of defen-
dant's mental health and family background) (emphasis in original).
205 A controversy generated by SchiroSchriro is how to determine "whether
the defendant waived the right to present mitigating evidence while balanc-
ing the need to protect defendants' rights in capital cases." See Dylan J.
Scher, Blystone v. Horn: The Third Circuit Guards Against Inadvertent
Waiver of the Right to Present Mitigating Evidence During a Capital Case, 58
VILL. L. REV. 869 (2014) (describing the Third Circuit's approach of limiting
SchiroSchriro to cases where defendants undeniably waive their right to pre-
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a defendant's conviction because, inter alia, his right to self-rep-
resentation was violated.206 The first part of the opinion ad-
dresses the threshold question of whether there is even a right to
proceed pro se at sentencing. 20 7 Having accepted the principle
that there is a right to proceed pro se at sentencing,28 the New
Jersey Supreme Court also noted that that the right is not abso-
lute: "There may be times, during both the guilt phase and pen-
alty phase, where the defendant will be required to cede control
of his defense to protect the integrity of the State's interest in
fair trials and permit courts to ensure that their judgments meet
the high level of reliability demanded by the Constitution. '" 20 9
The court thereupon ordered that there be "mandatory
standby defense counsel in capital cases." 210 The court reasoned
sent mitigating evidence, as distinguished from cases where defendants seek
to bar only specific mitigating evidence).
206 859 A.2d 1173,Reddishsupra note 5, at 1189 (N.J. 2004)..
207 Id. at 1188-92. The issue arose from the decision in Martinez v. Court of
Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate Dist., Martinez v. Court of Appeal of
California, 528 U.S. 152 (2004) (holding that there is no Sixth Amendment
right to self-representation on appeal).
208 859 A.2dReddish, supra note 5, at 1192
209 Id. Not directly relevant here but noteworthy nevertheless is the Reddish
court's suggested expansion of the contents of a Faretta colloquy. The court
"encourage[s] trial courts to explore subjects that are inherent in, or off-
shoots of," those warnings required its prior decision in State v. Crisaf!, 608
A.2d 317 (N.J. 1992), dealing with the contents of the colloquy. The Reddish
court then provided the following illustration:
[T]hose additional areas would include whether defendant will
experience difficulty in separating his roles as defendant and
counsel; whether defendant understands that he not only has
the right not to testify, but also the right not to incriminate him-
self in any manner; whether he understands that he could make
comments as counsel from which the jury might infer that he
had knowledge of incriminating evidence (and the difficulty in
avoiding such comments); and whether he fully understands
that if he crosses the line separating counsel from witness, he
may forfeit his right to remain silent and subject himself to
cross-examination by the State.
859 A.2d Reddish supra note 5, at 1197.
210 Id. at 1198.
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that trial judges under Faretta have the authority to appoint
standby counsel over defendant's objection, that death penalty
cases are subject to Eighth Amendment requirements, and that
one of these is that all mitigating evidence be introduced at sen-
tencing.211 An "inadequate and incompetent" presentation of
such evidence at sentencing,
"unacceptably poses a risk to the State of execut-
ing a defendant whose individual character and re-
cord do not warrant the ultimate punishment. The
most 'solemn business' of executing a human be-
ing cannot be 'subordinate[d] . . .to the whimsi-
cal-albeit voluntary-caprice of every accused
who wishes" unwisely to represent himself .... Al-
though Faretta, supra, discounted the fact that
most pro se defendants would fare better with
counsel's guidance,... courts must recognize that
unrestrained self-representation in capital trials
has the potential to beget "state aided suicide,"...
Honoring an incautious defendant's choice to ex-
ercise his self-representation right does not mean
a court must fulfill his death wish. That observa-
tion may overstate the dilemma in situations
where the defendant sincerely believes that he can
adequately represent himself. Yet, it is at least
true, in some cases, that a well-intentioned defen-
dant who proceeds pro se helps to execute his own
death warrant."' 212
Appointment of counsel to present mitigation evidence over a
defendant's objection has been approved by other state courts,
even after the Court in Schriro held it is not ineffective assis-
tance of counsel for defense counsel to obey his client's instruc-
tion not to do so. The Florida Supreme Court has even gone
211 Id. at 1198-1201.
212 Id. at 1201.
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beyond appointment of mitigation counsel; it permits trial
judges to require the state to introduce evidence in mitigation in
its possession, to call their own mitigation witnesses, or to re-
quire standby counsel to present mitigation evidence. 213
Thus, some courts in capital cases are cognizant of the impor-
tance of the sentencer's obligation to receive mitigation evi-
dence, and - despite the pro se defendant's refusal to offer it -
are willing to order counsel (e.g., variously referred to as amici,
standby counsel, independent counsel) to present it. This is done
to ensure that the court is not a party to the defendant's death
wish. However, this procedure seems to conflict with the Su-
preme Court's 2000 holding in Martinez v. Court of Appeal of
California.214 Martinez is best known for a majority opinion that
- in its language finding no Sixth Amendment right to proceed
pro se on appeal - signaled that the Court may be considering
overruling Faretta on grounds that trial judges have had practi-
cal difficulties implementing the right of self-representation:15
213 Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343, 364 (Fla. 2001). See also, Barnes v.
State, 29 So.3d 1010, 1022-23 (Fla. 2010) (court may appoint "special mitiga-
tion counsel" to present mitigation evidence); State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d
939, 937 (N.J. (1988) (trial court may appoint "new counsel" to present miti-
gation evidence); Lay v. State, 179 P.3d 615 (Okla. 2008) (affirming trial
court's denial of standby counsel to assist pro se defendant at sentencing, but
holding prospectively that "In the future, we require that the trial court ap-
point standby counsel in all capital cases where an indigent defendant is rep-
resenting himself/herself."). Compare, Drinkard v. State, 777 S.2d 225, rev'd
on other grounds, Ex Parte Drinkard, 777 So. 2d 295 (Ala. 2000) (finding no
error in trial court allowing pro se defendant to waive presentation of miti-
gating evidence, where court reviewed all possible mitigating facts that were
available from the trial record).
214 528 U.S. 152 (2000). Martinez, supra note 196.
215 Id. at 163. As Justice Breyer put it, reacting in his concurrence to the
majority's apparent diminution of the defendant's right to autonomy and
self-representation: "I note that judges closer to the firing line have some-
times expressed dismay about the practical consequences of that holding...
(right of self-representation "frequently, though not always, conflicts
squarely and inherently with the right to a fair trial"). I have found no em-
pirical research, however, that might help determine whether, in general, the
right to represent oneself furthers, or inhibits, the Constitution's basic guar-
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The requirement of representation by trained
counsel implies no disrespect for the individual in-
asmuch as it tends to benefit the appellant as well
as the court. Courts, of course, may still exercise
their discretion to allow a lay person to proceed
pro se. We already leave to the appellate courts'
discretion, keeping "the best interests of both the
prisoner and the government in mind," the deci-
sion whether to allow a pro se appellant to partici-
pate in, or even ," to be present at, oral
argument. . .Considering the change in position
from defendant to appellant, the autonomy interests
that survive a felony conviction are less compelling
than those motivating the decision in Faretta. Yet
the overriding state interest in the fair and effi-
cient administration of justice remains as strong as
at the trial level. Thus, the States are clearly
within their discretion to conclude that the gov-
ernment's interests outweigh an invasion of the
appellant's interest in self-representation. 216
antee of fairness. And without some strong factual basis for believing that
Faretta's holding has proved counterproductive in practice, we are not in a
position to reconsider the constitutional assumptions that underlie that case."
Id. at 164-65.
This view that there cannot be an absolute - or any, for that matter - right
to self-representation consistent with the court's duty "of ensuring that jus-
tice, in the broadest sense of that term, is achieved in every criminal trial,"
was espoused by Justice Burger dissenting in Faretta. 422 U.S.Faretta, supra
note 13 at 839. Ironically, Justice Burger goes on to say that "The system of
criminal justice should not be available as an instrument of self-destruction"
by recognition of a right to self-representation," Id. at 840, when the majority
of the Court years later in Schiriro permitted lawyers to disregard their cli-
ent's instruction to not put on evidence in mitigation, resulting in a different
and more serious "instrument of self-destruction" (or, "death wish" or "sui-
cide pact") that some courts wish to avoid by appointing counsel with instruc-
tions to present that evidence.
216 Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
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The italicized language above in the Martinez suggests that
greater restrictions, such as the denial of the right to proceed
pro se on appeal, on the right to self-representation after convic-
tion would not violate the Sixth Amendment due to the "less
compelling" autonomy rights of the defendant. However, at sen-
tencing the autonomy of the defendant is most at risk, recalling
the discussion above regarding sentencing being more signifi-
cant than the trial itself. Thus, some courts reject the principle
that the trial judge may appoint counsel to present mitigation
evidence at sentencing over defendant's objection. The leading
case is United States v. Davis, in which the Fifth Circuit reversed
a District Court's order appointing "independent counsel" to
present evidence in mitigation of the pro se defendant's sen-
tence. 217 The District Court had engaged in a lengthy justifica-
tion for appointment of counsel to present mitigating
evidence,218 but the Fifth Circuit reversed the appointment for
217 United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 2002).
218 United States v. Davis, et al., 180 F.Supp.2d 797, 797-98 (E.D. La. 2001):
Society has a strong and compelling interest in a full and fair
capital sentencing proceeding, regardless of the individual cir-
cumstances of a particular case. This interest requires the pres-
entation of both aggravating and mitigating factors to the jury
that will be deciding life or death. Without that information,
the jury cannot perform its statutory function and make an in-
formed, reliable decision. In this instance, Davis wishes to ab-
rogate those requirements because of a desire to receive the
death penalty. While these safeguards are intended to protect
an individual defendant from an arbitrary and capricious exe-
cution, they serve an equally, if not more, important purpose in
protecting society from participating in an execution that is not
warranted. The jurors are not "potted plants" to be left in the
dark by a headstrong defendant with a personal agenda, but
rather are the representatives of a civilized society with the
"awesome responsibility" of expressing the values and stan-
dards of that society in the most serious and final of all deci-
sions. The law has set forth what is required for them to
perform their duties, statutorily and morally. "The public has
an interest in the reliability and integrity of a death sentencing
decision that transcends the preferences of individual defend-
ants."..... This Court perceives itself as constitutionally obliged
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two reasons: 1) there was no statutory, inherent, or case law au-
thority for the appointment,29 and, 2) because to do so would
violate the defendant's right to employ "an admittedly risky
strategy during the penalty phase," i.e., attacking the govern-
ment's case as to his guilt.220 A number of other courts follow
the Davis holding, namely, that it is a violation of defendant's
Faretta right of self-representation to appoint independent coun-
sel to present mitigating evidence over his objection. 22'
to "police" these proceedings with "an especially vigilant con-
cern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of
factfinding."
Id. at 807-08. In its reasoning the District Court cited a pre-McKaskle case,
United States v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that the court
may appoint standby counsel over a defendant's objection to see to it that all
of the facts favorable to the defendant would be brought out at trial, "in
order to protect the public interest in the fairness and integrity of the pro-
ceedings."), and a series of state cases in which counsel had been appointed
to present evidence in mitigation over a capital defendant's objection, includ-
ing Muhammed v. State, 782 So.2d 343, 363 (Fla. 2001); State v. Koedatich,
548 A.2d 939, 992 (N.J. 1988); Morrison v. State, 373 S.E.2d 506, 509 (Ga.
1988); State v. Dodd, 838 P.2d 86 (1992).
219 285 F.3d 378Davis, supra note 206, at 382-83.
220 Id. at 384-85.
221 See e.g., People v. Blair, 115 P.3d 1145, 1178 (CalifCal. 2005), reversed on
other grounds, People v. Black, 320 P.3d 800, 805-06 (CalifCal. 2014)
("[A]lthough the decision in Martinez speaks of the diminution of a defen-
dant's autonomy interests after conviction and on appeal, Martinez does not
address the level of autonomy interest enjoyed by a defendant during sen-
tencing. We find nothing in Martinez to persuade us that a defendant's au-
tonomy interests are any less compelling at the penalty phase of a capital trial
than at the guilt phase. The defendant at sentencing is still in the position of
being "hailed into court" by the state ... and thus still has an interest in
personally presenting his or her defense."); accord: Silagy v. Peters (7th
Cir.1990) 905 F.2d 986, 1006-1008 (7th Cir. 1990) (the right to self-represen-
tation applies to the penalty phase of a capital case even if the defendant
chooses to forgo the presentation of mitigating evidence; Eighth Amendment
held no bar to the imposition of sentence under these circumstances); People
v. Silagy, 461 N.E.2d 415, 429-432 (Il. 1984) (defendant may waive counsel
and seek death at sentencing); Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264, 1274-1276
(Ind. 1997) (reversing appointment of a special counsel to present mitigating
evidence over the defendant's objection); Bridges v. State, 6 P.3d 1000, 1012
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Thus, courts that give greater weight to the necessity under
the Eighth Amendment to present evidence in mitigation to the
jury than the right to self-representation recognize the impor-
tance of counsel to the court for this purpose, while others re-
verse the weight given to these interests. The relevance here is
that, alternative to the imposition of unwanted (or "indepen-
dent") counsel on the pro se defendant, courts could instead
readmonish the defendant of the right to counsel immediately
after a guilty plea or verdict. In the cases in which the pro se
defendant takes up the court's offer to reappoint counsel, the
need to impose unwanted counsel is obviated.
IV. COURT APPROACHES TO THE ISSUE OF POST-TRIAL
READMONISHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Given the foundational importance of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, the need to ensure a fair and reliable process,
the complexity of the sentencing stage itself, and the reality that
sentencing is probably more important to the defendant than
the trial, it may surprise some that courts differ on the question
of readmonishment of the right to counsel at sentencing. The
case law reveals variation in the approaches taken toward this
question, as well as the factual circumstances and procedural
posture of the cases in which the issue arises.
Many courts begin their analysis of a right-to-counsel issue
with a recitation of the principle that a defendant's right to
counsel is not absolute, citing the Supreme Court's language in
McKaskle v. Wiggins, which states that a defendant is not enti-
tled to "choreograph special appearances by counsel."222 How-
ever, in ,McKaskle the Court's focus was on a claim that the pro
se defendant's appointed standby counsel had exceeded the lim-
ited authority the defendant had given him, and had thereby de-
(Nev. 2002) (pro se capital defendant not required to introduce mitigating
evidence and may seek the death penalty).
222 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984).
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prived the defendant of a fair trial.223 The attorney was not
acting as defense counsel, but rather as standby counsel, who by
current definition plays only a limited role in the defense.224 In
its comment about the choreographing counsel's appearance,
the Court appears to be referring to the possibility that a defen-
dant would adopt a "hybrid" representation strategy at trial by
dividing defense duties between himself and counsel almost
equally, an arrangement of which the majority of courts disap-
prove.225 The Court was not referring to the case of a pro se
defendant's decision to revoke his waiver of counsel and turn
the defense back over to a lawyer after being convicted at trial -
223 465 U.SId. at 173.
224 But see, Jona Goldschmidt, Judging the Effectiveness of Standby Counsel:
Are they Phone Psychics? Theatrical Understudies? Or Both?, 24 So. CALIF.
REV. LAW & SOCIAL J. 121 (2015) (arguing for a constitutional right to "As-
sistance" of counsel by means of effective standby counsel, and application of
Strickland effectiveness test to measure their performance).
225 On hybrid representation, it is disfavored by the courts, but see e.g., Jo-
seph A. Colquitt, Hybrid Representation: Standing the Two-Sided Coin on Its
Edge, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 55, 79 (2003) ("While all federal circuits agree
there is no federal constitutional right to hybrid representation, a question
remains concerning whether such representation falls within the supervisory
powers of the federal courts. Guided by considerations of justice, fairness,
and necessity, federal courts exercise such powers to 'formulate procedural
rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress.' Federal
courts may exercise their supervisory powers when necessary to fashion rem-
edies for the violation of recognized rights, preserve judicial integrity, and
deter illegal conduct."). Some courts are willing to permit hybrid representa-
tion in the court's discretion. State v. Figueroa, 897 A.2d 1050, 1052 (N.J.
2006) (hybrid representation within court's discretion, "[t]hat exercise of dis-
cretion requires that the trial court start from the presumption that hybrid
representation is to be discouraged."). It is also a matter of concern to appel-
late courts. Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1049 (Pa. 2011) (referring
to a proposed course of action for prisoner appeals that would keep in place
"the prohibition against hybrid representation."). Some jurisdictions permit-
ted hybrid representation based upon the wording of a state constitution that
permits a defendant to appear by himself "and" by counsel, rather than him-
self "or" by counsel. Allen v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.2d 125, 133 (Ky.
2013) (noting that section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution provides for the
right to be heard "by himself and counsel.").
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or after pleading guilty without counsel - for purposes of repre-
sentation at sentencing or a post-trial motion.
Certainly, requests for reappointment of counsel may prop-
erly be denied because of untimeliness, equivocal requests, or if
pro se defendants repeatedly alternate their position regarding
their representation, possibly through multiple trial stages, for
purposes of delay.226 To refuse counsel once, and then request
counsel's reappointment (due to a pro se defendant's legitimate
questioning of his own competence to proceed to sentencing),
should not be considered vacillation. The discussion here as-
sumes no dilatory or obstructionist conduct. Rather, it assumes
there has been a one-time waiver of counsel, followed by a de-
sire of the pro se defendant post-trial to withdraw or revoke that
waiver.
The question usually addressed in case law is whether a
Faretta hearing should have been held at a particular time dur-
ing the post-trial stage of the prosecution, after which the defen-
dant was permitted, or continued to proceed, pro se. The Faretta
hearing is the second part of a hearing that begins with the col-
loquy regarding whether there has been a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of the right to counsel. The Faretta hearing portion
revolves around the question of whether the defendant's in-
tended invocation of the right to self-representation (as distin-
guished from the aforementioned waiver of the right to counsel)
226 See, e.g., McQueen v. Blackburn, 755 F.2d 1174, 1178 (5th Cir.),. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852 (1985) (late request for counsel could impede the
proper and efficient administration of counsel); United States v. Magee, 741
F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1984) (grant of request to change counsel on the morn-
ing of trial a matter for court's sound discretion); Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d
1272, 1295 (11th Cir. 2011) ("'Even if defendant requests to represent him-
self, . . . the right may be waived through defendant's subsequent conduct
indicating he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned his request alto-
gether.' ") (alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d
607, 611 (5th Cir.1982)); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 51 (10th
Cir.1976) (defendant "forfeited his right to self-representation by his vacillat-
ing positions," and thereby failed to show "a clear and unequivocal position
on self-representation").
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is knowingly and intelligently made, and conveys to the defen-
dant the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, as well
as the maximum possible penalty. Thus, the issue of readmon-
ishment can arise from either, or both, cases involving invalid
waiver-of-counsel claims or ineffective Faretta hearing claims.
If an appellate court finds the Faretta colloquy is necessary, it
thereby implicitly recognizes that a pro se defendant has a con-
tinuing right to counsel at sentencing. That is, by virtue of the
requirements for the content of Faretta colloquies regarding the
right to counsel (and the dangers and disadvantages of waiving
that right) at certain points post-trial, these courts (contrary to
those which follow the continuing waiver principle) recognize
the right to be informed (or readmonished) of the right to coun-
sel. Because the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue
of whether the Faretta hearing (.e., readmonishment) is required
at sentencing, this Part provides an overview of the approaches
lower courts have taken, and their rationales and justifications
for doing so.
A. Continuing Waiver
Federal and state courts are divided on the question of
whether defendants who validly waive their right to trial counsel
are entitled to be readmonished of their right to counsel at the
sentencing or post-trial motion stages. Their reasons vary. Some
courts hold there is no right to readmonishment unless the
waiver is expressly limited to the trial or pre-trial stages, the de-
fendant makes a specific request to withdraw his earlier waiver,
or there have been some changed circumstances requiring
readmonishment or reappointment.
One of the earliest decisions expressing the continuing waiver
principle is United States v. Davis (published in 1955, reviewing
a 1935 conviction), in which the Eighth Circuit held it could "see
no reason why the court at each subsequent proceeding should
go through the mere ceremony of again inquiring if the defen-
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dant knew his rights and was then again willing to waive
them."2 27 There, however, the defendant claimed that he was
not advised of his right to counsel at his arraignment for kidnap-
ping and conspiracy to kidnap, and "was led to believe he would
be given a term of years if he entered a plea of guilty." 228 Four
days later, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, prompting the
appellate court to remark that "[i]t would be straining human
credulity to say that he did not possess the same knowledge and
intelligence four days later on June 7th. The sentencing ... was
but an extension of the arraignment proceedings." 229 The court
in denying habeas relief reasoned:
The fact that the sentencing took place four days
after the arraignment could create a need for fur-
ther inquiry only if something transpired in the in-
terim which justified such further inquiry, such as
a request by Davis for counsel and advice when he
appeared for sentencing. Davis made no request
and made no statement, and accordingly Judge
Joyce was entirely justified in taking his prior re-
fusal of counsel as 'definite'. There was indeed an
implied waiver of counsel as to any proceedings
subsequent to June 3, 1935. If this were not true,
it would mean that in all criminal proceedings
where the defendant competently waived the right
to counsel and nothing happened in the meantime,
such as an unreasonable lapse of time, newly dis-
covered evidence which might require or justify
227 Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 834, 840 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 912 (1956).
228 Id. at 837.
229 Id. at 838. He claimed additionally that at the time of his arrest he was
struck in the head, a gun had accidentally discharged near him, that he was
questioned at length and kept in close custody, and that a plane on which he
had flown had encountered severe turbulence, all of which would have made
him incapable of "intelligently and competently" waiving his right to counsel.
Id.
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advice of counsel, new charges brought, a request
from the defendant, or similar circumstances, he
would nevertheless have to be interrogated in the
same fashion on each subsequent step therein.
That would be neither good law nor good sense.
Noteworthy is the fact that the Davis court placed the onus on
the pro se defendant to make a specific request for reappoint-
ment of counsel, absent other changed circumstances "which
would require or justify the right to counsel," such as "unreason-
able lapse of time," newly discovered evidence, or new charges.
The court did not even consider the fact of a guilty plea or a
conviction at trial as constituting a change of circumstances war-
ranting the trial judge's readmonishment of a defendant of the
right to reappointment of counsel.
Likewise, in Arnold v. United States,230 the Ninth Circuit re-
jected a pro se defendant's claim that his waiver of counsel was
invalid because trial court failed to advise him, inter alia, of his
right to counsel after trial, and before sentencing:
While it is true that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel applies at all critical stages of the prosecu-
tion, including the sentencing stage, it does not
follow that once the assistance of counsel in court
has been competently waived, a new waiver must
be obtained at every subsequent court appearance
by the defendant. A competent election by the de-
fendant to represent himself and to decline the as-
sistance of counsel once made before the court
carries forward through all further proceedings in
that case unless appointment of counsel for subse-
quent proceedings is expressly requested by the
defendant or there are circumstances which sug-
Volume 8, Number 2
230 Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1968).
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gest that the waiver was limited to a particular
stage of the proceedings." 231
Four years earlier the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclu-
sion in White v. United States, in which a defendant pled guilty
and was sentenced without having been admonished of his right
to counsel at sentencing.232 In that case, the court also placed
emphasis on the fact that the defendant failed to request coun-
sel: "White gave no indication at the hearing at which the
sentences were imposed that he did not understand that he had
the right to the assistance of counsel at that hearing, or that he
wished to withdraw his waiver previously given. Under these cir-
cumstances, the court was entitled to assume that the waiver was
still in effect, and was not required to again advise White of his
right to counsel."233
The Tenth Circuit reached the same result in Panagos v.
United States, where the defendant was "clearly and adequately
advised" of his right to counsel,234 and validly waived it. While
the court recognized that the defendant was entitled to appoint-
ment of counsel at sentencing if he desired it,235 it rejected his
claim that he was entitled to be readmonished because he had
231 Id. See also, United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 186 (9th 1973)
("[ilt is that the keystone determination or resolution of the two-pronged
problem in the first instance is whether the request to waive the assistance of
competent counsel is competently and intelligently made because with that
determination the die is cast.") (emphasis added); Jensen v. Hernandez, 864
F.Supp.2d 869, 897 (E.D. CalifCal. 2012) (holding that a valid waiver of coun-
sel generally carries forward through all stages of the proceedings, unless de-
fendant makes express request, the waiver was limited to a particular stage of
the proceedings, or "significantly changed" circumstances indicate the defen-
dant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel).
232 White v. United States, 354 F.2d 22, 23 (9th Cir. 1965)
233 Id. See also, McCormick v. Adams, 621 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 2010) ("If
McCormick's waiver was subject to renewal at multiple pretrial hearings, the
trial court would be required to determine that his waiver was knowing and
voluntary at each relevant appearance ... But this is not the law: the validity
of a waiver is typically assessed at the time of entry.")(.") (citation omitted).
234 Panagos v. United States, 324 F.2d 764, 765 (10th Cir. 1963).
235 Id.
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failed to overcome the presumption of regularity that applies in
collateral review of trial proceedings, citing Johnson v. Zerbst.236
In Zerbst the Supreme Court held in part that a judgment can-
not be lightly set aside by collateral attack (such as habeas
corpus), and when collaterally attacked, the judgment of a court
has a presumption of regularity.237
A second reason for denying relief to the defendant in Pana-
gos was a lack of any change in circumstances since the initial
waiver was given:
The record in the case at bar shows that the delay
which ensued between the time of plea and the
time of sentencing was due entirely to the need for
preparation of a presentence report. There was no
change in conditions and no other proceedings
had during the interim. Appellant makes no con-
tention that there was any actual change in appel-
lant's position during the this [sic] period of time.
The record shows no facts or circumstances which
would prevent the initial waiver of the right to
counsel, knowingly and intelligently made, from
extending to and being fully effective at the time
of sentencing. Nothing intervened between the
plea and sentencing except time, and not an un-
reasonable amount of that.238
236 The Panagos court also cited Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957),
and Christakos v. Hunter, 161 F.2d 692 (10th Cir.), cert. den., 332 U.S. 801
(1947). See also, United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding reversal necessary due to failure of trial judge to advise defendant of
the correct maximum penalty he faced when obtaining his waiver of counsel,
and the failure at a second trial due to mistrial to conduct a Faretta hearing to
determine whether defendant desired to withdraw his previous waiver);
Schell v. United States, 423 F.2d 101, 103 (7th Cir. 1970) (same).
237 324 F.2dPanagos, supra note 223, at 765.
238 Id. See also, United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 1989)
("Once the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel, only a substantial change in circumstances will require the district
court to inquire whether the defendant wishes to revoke his earlier
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The third rationale the Panagos court gave for refusing to rec-
ognize the right to readmonishment was based on the theory
that a waiver, once validly made, is an implied waiver for all
other subsequent stages of the prosecution.239 The court relied
upon the aforementioned Eighth Circuit decision in Davis v.
United States240 for this proposition.
Sometimes a new charge, added after a valid waiver of coun-
sel, is alleged to be the substantial change in circumstances war-
ranting a Faretta hearing and appointment of new counsel. That
was the claim in Arrellanes v. United States, where the Govern-
ment charged the pro se defendant with being a second-offender
after his waiver of counsel.241 The Court held:
The circumstances here did not require further di-
rect intervention by the court with respect to the
assistance of counsel. After the verdict was re-
turned, motions for new trial and judgment not-
withstanding the verdict were made and appellant
waiver[.]"); United States v. Hantzis, 625 F.3d 575, 580-81 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding Faretta hearing not required "unless intervening events substantially
change the circumstances existing at the time of the initial colloquy.").
239 Id. See also Jennifer E. Parker, Constitutional Law - United States v.
Goldberg: The Third Circuit's Nontraditional Approach to Waiver of the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1173, 1203-07 (1996)
(describing the three categories of waiver of counsel first enunciated in
United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 [3d Cir. 1995], i.e., [1] express
waiver; [2] implied waiver, or waiver by conduct; and [3] forfeiture, and argu-
ing that the Third Circuit should clarify the nature and extent of disruptive
conduct by a defendant that would suffice to meet its respective - seemingly
overlapping - definitions of implied waiver and forfeiture).
240 226 F.2d 834, Davis, supra note 216, at 840, cert. den. 351 U.S. 912 (1956)
(holding that defendant's waiver of counsel when pleading guilty was an im-
plied waiver as to any subsequent proceedings, including sentencing four
days later). Also following Davis was United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d
277, 286 (3d Cir. 1965) ("Although at his sentencing, appellant appeared in
court without counsel, he does not complain that his sentence is voidable for
that reason. Nevertheless, we do not think it amiss to point out that it has
been held that waiver of counsel at the time of arraignment is an implied
waiver of that assistance during the sentencing proceeding,"," citing Davis)).
241 Arrellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 602, 610 (9th Cir. 1962).
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requested a continuance for the purpose of con-
sulting counsel and preparing for the presentation
of these motions, and the taking of an appeal. A
week's continuance was granted. At the post-
poned time appellant appeared and in the
meantime had consulted counsel. Nevertheless, he
moved for a further continuance solely for the
purpose of further preparing the presentation of
the motions. The court denied this motion to-
gether with others appellant made, and proceeded
to pronounce judgment.
While appellant and [sic] the same right to counsel
in these later proceedings as at all stages, . . . it
would constitute an excessive burden to require
the trial court to intervene at each potentially sep-
arable stage of trial to conduct an inquiry respect-
ing a party's continuing wishes with respect to
counsel,... when, as here, appellant's continuing
state of mind respecting his original waiver is
clear. This is not a case where the situation with
reference to the representation has changed be-
tween trial and sentencing ... Nor is it a situation
where the filing of the second-offender informa-
tion gives rise to a full-scale trial of complex is-
sues, as in some state habitual criminal practice...
Here, on the contrary, the sole issue is that of the
identity of the defendant, a narrower inquiry ...
In any event, whether he was the same person
named in the information was a fact peculiarly
within the knowledge of defendant. Counsel could
not have helped him to determine this; hence, no
prejudice resulted.242
242 Id. at 610-11 (citations omitted).
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A review of the state court authorities rejecting the right to
readmonishment reveals more recent examples. About five state
high courts take the position that readmonishment of the right
to counsel is unnecessary given a valid prior waiver, because the
criminal trial includes sentencing, and the waiver once made is
continuing. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that a
waiver of counsel at arraignment applies to all stages of the
proceedings:
In the absence of some circumstances indicating
that the waiver is limited, or other facts which
would give the trial court reason to conduct a fur-
ther inquiry, we hold, consistent with the weight of
authority, that a competent waiver of counsel at
arraignment by a defendant who is advised that he
has a constitutional right to counsel at all stages of
the proceedings is operative at the time of
sentencing.243
243 People v. Baker, 440 N.E.2d 856, 860-61 (111.1982) According to the court,
The record clearly establishes that his election to [waive coun-
sel] ... was voluntarily, knowingly and understandingly made.
Under these circumstances, we do not believe the trial judge
was required to renew the offer of counsel or ascertain whether
defendant had changed his mind when he appeared for sen-
tencing two weeks later. The greater number of courts consid-
ering the precise issue here presented have held that a
competent waiver of counsel by a defendant once made before
the court carries forward to all subsequent proceedings unless
defendant later requests counsel or there are circumstances
which suggest that the waiver was limited to a particular stage
of the proceedings."
Id. (citations omitted). The citations were: State v. Carpenter, 390 So.2d 1296,
1299 (La. 1980); State v. Harig, 218 N.W.2d 884, 890-91 (Neb. 1974), reaf-
firmed, State v. Tiff, 260 N.W.2d 296, 303 (Neb. 1977); State v. Steed, 506 P.2d
1031, 1033 (Ariz. 1977); State v. Mathis, 159 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Wis. 1968);
Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1969) (en banc); Arnold
v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1021 (1970); Panagos v. United States, 324 F.2d 764, 765 (10th Cir. 1963);,
supra note 223; and Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 834 (8th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 912 (1956, supra note 216).
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Another high court held that a waiver at trial applies to the
penalty phase.244 A third held that "[t]his court has consistently
described the guilt and penalty portions of a capital case as be-
ing 'phases' of the same trial."245
244 Lay v. State, 179 P.3d 615, 620 (Okla. 2008) (defendant's "waiver of coun-
sel was valid for the entire trial, including the sentencing phase").
245 Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 709 A.2d 849 (Penn. 1998) (Defendant "points
to nothing which supports his assertion that the two phases of his capital case
were two separate trials."). Accord, State v. Modica, 149 P.3d 446, 452
(Wash. App. 2006) ("[A] valid waiver of the right to assistance of counsel
generally continues throughout the criminal proceedings, unless the circum-
stances suggest that the waiver was limited... [lit is not ordinarily incumbent
upon a trial court to intervene at a later stage of the proceedings to inquire
about a party's continuing desire to proceed pro se.") (citations omitted);
and, State v. Winkler, 698 S.E.2d 596 (S.C. 2010):
"[O]nce a trial has begun, a defendant's right to represent him-
self 'is sharply curtailed,' and the judge considering the motion
must weigh 'the prejudice to the legitimate interests of the de-
fendant' against the 'potential disruption of proceedings al-
ready in progress.' "). The sentencing phase of a capital trial
does not constitute a separate trial...
Appellant did not make his request to proceed pro se at the
beginning of trial. Appellant made his request to proceed pro
se at the beginning of the sentencing phase, which is not a sepa-
rate trial. Thus, review of this issue is governed by the abuse of
discretion standard outlined above and Appellant's right to re-
present himself was sharply curtailed by his failure to exercise
this right prior to trial.
Id. at 602-03 (citations omitted).
The issue has also arisen in the probation revocation context. The case
involved a pro se defendant who pled guilty to probation violation after sign-
ing a written waiver of counsel at the previous trial. Hatten v. State, 71
S.W.3d 332 (Tex. 2000) (Ct. Crim. App.).. 2000). The court found that the
trial court only needed to conduct a waiver inquiry where the pro se defen-
dant desires to plead guilty, which it did, and that no Faretta warnings were
thereafter required. Id. at 334. In its reasoning the court noted an "impor-
tant distinction in Texas criminal jurisprudence that must be drawn," that
"this court determined that Faretta is triggered when a defendant appears
without an attorney to contest his guilt, but it is not triggered when a defen-
dant appears without an attorney to plead guilty or nolo contendere." Id.
(citations omitted).
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A case illustrating the discretionary approach to the issue of
reappointment of counsel is John-Charles v. California, where
the pro se defendant received several postponements of his
multi-defendant state court trial, and then sought reappoint-
ment of counsel on the opening day of voir dire.246 On habeas
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the right to counsel after a
valid waiver is discretionary with the court, citing cases from the
Third,247 Fourth,248 Seventh, 249 and Tenth250 Circuits.
In John-Charles the defendant engaged in conduct causing de-
lay before making the request, leading the court to conclude
that "a state court could make a principled distinction between
Gideon's general standard and the factual scenario here, where
a defendant has waived the right to counsel established by
Gideon."251 In the cases cited in John-Charles, the pro se de-
fendants had (1) filed a civil action against the trial judge pre-
trial, and sought reappointment of counsel when jury selection
was about to begin,252 (2) made the request for reappointment
11 days before trial,253 (3) made the request for reappointment
246 John-Charles v. California, 646 F.3d 1243, 1250 (9th Cir. 2011).
247 United States v. Leveto, 540 F.3d 200, 207 (3d Cir. 2008).
248 United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 1989).
249 United States v. Solina, 733 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (7th Cir. 1984).
250 United States v. Merchant, 992 F.2d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 1993).
251 646 F.3dJohn-Charles, supra note 235, at 1250.
252 Leveto, 540 F.3dsupra note 236, at 205.
253 West, 877 F.2dsupra note 237, at 286:
Nor was it error to deny Mills' subsequent request eleven days
before trial to substitute Mr. Yannerella for himself as counsel.
The determination of whether or not a motion for substitution
of counsel should be granted is within the trial court's discre-
tion, and the court is entitled to take into account the counter-
vailing public interest in proceeding on schedule. . . This
countervailing interest has no less weight merely because the
motion is filed by a pro se defendant.... (trial court is necessa-
rily entitled to take into account the countervailing interest in
proceeding on schedule when defendant requests continuance
on basis that he does not have counsel to represent him). We
have said that "[t]he defendant cannot be allowed to continue
the practice, with little or no apparent reason, of hiring and
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of standby counsel as defense counsel on the day of trial,254 and
(4) "made [the request] well after meaningful trial proceedings
had begun and after the government had completed nearly two-
thirds of its case. "255
firing attorneys," . . . and this remains true when the defendant
is "hiring and firing" himself.
Id. (citations omitted).
254 United States v. Solina, 733 F.2dsupra note 238, at 1211.
The judge refused the continuance, and again we think he was
acting within his discretion in doing so. A criminal defendant
has a constitutional right to defend himself; and with rights
come responsibilities. If at the last minute he gets cold feet and
wants a lawyer to defend him he runs the risk that the judge
will hold him to his original decision in order to avoid the dis-
ruption of the court's schedule that a continuance granted on
the very day that trial is scheduled to begin is bound to cause.
Both defendants have previous experience with the criminal
justice system. That both should have moved for continuances
on the opening day of trial suggested to the district judge, who
has long experience with litigation out of Marion-the nation's
maximum-security federal prison (successor to Alcatraz), ... -
that these last-minute changes of mind were intended to delay
the trial. We are inclined to defer to his intuition but in any
event believe that the scheduling problems the continuances
would have caused were in themselves sufficient ground for re-
fusing to delay the trial, in the absence of any showing that ei-
ther Bruscino's appointed counsel or Solina (assisted by
standby counsel) were incapable of conducting an adequate
defense.
Id. at 1211-12 (citations omitted).
255 Merchant, 992 F.2dsupra note 239, at 1095-96.
Once a defendant exercises his constitutional right to defend
himself and proceed pro se, he does not have the absolute right
to thereafter withdraw his request for self representation and
receive substitute counsel.... ("Since he has waived his right to
counsel, he cannot now assert that the trial court erred in not
replacing the attorney whose assistance he has waived."). We
review a district court's refusal to substitute counsel for an
abuse of discretion...
In reviewing requests for the substitution of counsel, courts
consider, inter alia, the degree to which a defendant has shown
good cause and the timeliness of the request. Id. "It is well
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The foregoing decisions presume extreme dilatory or bad
faith conduct in the pro se defendant's decision to request reap-
pointment of counsel. The rationales given by the courts which
hold the right to counsel (or reappointment of counsel) is not
absolute based on the rationale of avoiding delay and inconve-
nience to the court, witnesses, etc., simply do not apply to the
sentencing or post-trial motion context. In those cases, where
pro se defendants have a change of heart and simply decide they
would be better off for sentencing purposes with counsel than
without, there is no reason to deny reappointment of counsel if
the request is timely made (presumably at the conclusion of the
trial or a reasonable time thereafter), or, as I argue here, where
the court makes the initial offer to reappoint counsel even
where no request is even made.
There are, however, a few decisions in which courts have
found a Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel violation at sentenc-
ing due to a change in circumstances. These involve situations in
which the defendant appeared pro se and the trial judge made
no inquiry concerning the absence of counsel who had repre-
sented petitioner at the time the guilty plea was entered, 256 and
cases in which there was a lengthy delay between a guilty plea
hearing and sentencing.257 It stands to reason that to have been
found guilty of one or more criminal charges after unsuccess-
fully defending oneself pro se in a criminal trial would also con-
stitute a change in circumstances sufficient to justify
readmonishing the defendant of his right to withdraw his earlier
waiver, and to re-invoke his right to counsel.
within the discretion of the court to deny as untimely requests
for counsel made after meaningful trial proceedings have
begun."
Id. at 1095 (citations omitted).
256 See, Kuehnert v. Turner, 499 P.2d 839 (Utah 1972); In re Haro, 458 P.2d
500, 505-06 (CalifCal. 1969) (same).
257 Schell v. United States, 423 F.2d 101, 103 (7th Cir. 1970).
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B. Courts Recognizing the Right To Readmonishment
A study of those decisions which recognize the right to
readmonishment reveals that some reach that conclusion by
finding that a trial court erroneously failed to conduct a Faretta
colloquy (sometimes couched in terms of invalid waiver), or
conducted an imperfect one, due to inadequate warnings about
self-representation. Others reach their conclusion based on the
more direct question of whether a pro se defendant is permitted
to withdraw a previously-made waiver of counsel. Still others
reach the issue in terms of whether there was a judicial duty to,
sua sponte, inform the defendant of his right to counsel. In both
contexts, i.e., the hearing on waiver of counsel and a Faretta
hearing to determine whether defendant chose self-representa-
tion "with eyes open," the warnings by definition relate to the
existence of the right to counsel.
1. Federal Cases
Examples of claims of erroneous grants of motions to proceed
pro se at sentencing include United States v. Salameh, where the
Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of defendant's
pro se request because Faretta warnings had not been adminis-
tered.258 The defendants sought, and were granted, vacatur of
their sentences because, after discharging their trial counsel,
they were granted leave to represent themselves at sentencing
without first knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving
their right to counsel.259 Likewise, in United States v. Virgil, the
Fifth Circuit found the Sixth Amendment was violated because
no Faretta hearing was conducted at sentencing.260
Volume 8, Number 2
258 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998).
259 Id. at 161.
260 United States v. Virgil, 444 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2006).
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In Hall v. Moore, the trial judge was required to re-sentence
the represented defendant after two appeals. 26' The judge, how-
ever, resentenced the defendant at a hearing at which defense
counsel was unable to attend.262 Rejecting the state's argument
that the judge's re-sentencing was merely a ministerial act, the
Eleventh Circuit found a Sixth Amendment violation because
no Faretta hearing was conducted upon the re-sentencing:
"This court has not addressed the specific issue
presented here: whether the absence of counsel at
a re-sentencing violates a petitioner's Sixth
Amendment right. We have precedent, however,
that lends guidance to a resolution of this issue. In
Golden v. Newsome, . .. , this court discussed the
absence/presence of counsel at a sentencing pro-
ceeding. We stated:
'Obviously, where the precise sentence for a
particular offense is mandatorily fixed by law
such that its imposition is merely a ministerial
ceremony, with no discretion to be exercised
by the sentencing judge, the absence of coun-
sel at such a proceeding could not possibly be
prejudicial.'
The court also commented that if the sentencing
proceeding is more than ministerial, the presence
of counsel is essential to guide the sentencing
court in the exercise of its discretion. . . . "[T]he
absence of counsel is therefore legally presumed
to be prejudicial if the sentencing court had the
legal authority to impose a more lenient sentence
than it actually did." . . . The Supreme Court has
also noted that the total denial of counsel at a crit-
ical stage such as sentencing is presumptively prej-
udicial. . . Moreover, the Florida appellate courts
261 Hall v. Moore, 253 F.3d 624, 625 (11th Cir. 2001).
262 Id. at 626.
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recognize that re-sentencing hearings are critical
stages where the right to counsel attaches.... It is
clear from the record that the entire sentencing
package was set aside. Therefore, Hall's presence
and his counsel's presence were a necessity, not a
"luxury." . . . The trial court did not conduct a
Faretta hearing before it sentenced Hall. The
judge appeared to recognize the importance of the
absence of Hall's counsel, but he did not question
Hall to ensure that his choice to appear without
counsel was made with "eyes open." . . . Moreo-
ver, Hall never clearly declared to the sentencing
judge that he wanted to represent himself and that
he did not want counsel's assistance. In light of
Hall's failure to clearly and unequivocally assert
his right to self-representation, there is a presump-
tion of prejudice to Hall." 263
As distinguished from the absence of any Faretta hearing,
other courts have found deficiencies in such hearings leading to
inadequate waivers of counsel at sentencing, and a Sixth
Amendment violation. Generally, the problem is a lack of ade-
quate discussion regarding the dangers and disadvantages of
proceeding pro se.264 Courts not only have found Sixth Amend-
ment violations where judges failed to address the dangers and
disadvantages of proceeding pro se,2 65 but also because they
263 Id. at 627 (citations omitted).
264 The Court in Faretta required judges to ensure defendants waiving coun-
sel do so "knowingly and intelligently," and that they also "be made aware of
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open'." Faretta, 422 U.S.supra note 13, at 835.
265 See e.g., United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1488 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citations omitted) ("At no point in the record, however, does it appear that
the district court apprised Balough that self-representation presented any
dangers or disadvantages. At Balough's hearing to waive counsel, the district
court only advised Balough that he had a right to counsel and would be re-
quired to handle the rest of his case himself if allowed to proceed without
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failed to provide the defendant with correct maximum penalty
information.266
A case involving a hybrid representation request is United
States v. Cano, another Fifth Circuit case, where the defendant
unsuccessfully moved, early in the prosecution, for an order per-
mitting hybrid representation (he and his present attorney),
which was denied.267 Citing McKaskle v. Wiggins for the pro-
position that there is no constitutional right to hybrid represen-
tation, the trial judge's ruling meant the defendant would have
to represent himself.268 The defendant then withdrew the re-
quest because of a claimed inability to represent himself due to
a lack of access to a law library.269
Then, eighteen days before sentencing the defendant moved
to proceed pro se because he was dissatisfied with the lack of
consultations with his attorney - this motion was also denied.270
The Fifth Circuit found a Sixth Amendment violation where the
trial court failed to conduct a Faretta hearing before denying the
defendants "clear and unequivocal" invocation of his right to
self-representation.271 The Circuit Court first noted that, "[a]t
counsel; at his sentencing hearing, Balough was merely asked whether he
wished to continue without counsel. At each crucial stage, Balough was al-
lowed to proceed on his own without being warned that he would be at a
disadvantage doing so or advised how trained counsel could assist him.").
266 United States v. Silkwood, 893 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1989) ("Besides its
general statements about the seriousness of sentence enhancement, the trial
court informed Mr. Silkwood that his sentence 'could be enhanced up to fif-
teen years and a substantial fine.' This statement is not only inadequate but
also incorrect. In fact, the trial court sentenced Mr. Silkwood to twenty-five
years without parole. Since the trial court's inquiry could not have ensured
that Mr. Silkwood voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to
counsel, we remand this case for resentencing and direct the sentencing court
to appoint counsel to assist Mr. Silkwood unless, after proper inquiry, Mr.
Silkwood waives that right.").
267 United States v. Cano, 519 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2008).
268 Id. at 516.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 516.
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issue is whether, in light of the new request [to proceed pro se],
the district court was obligated to hold a hearing on Cano's mo-
tion. This is an issue of first impression in our circuit."272 In its
reasoning, the court first discussed the factors that trial judges
should consider in determining whether waivers of the right to
counsel are "knowingly and intelligently" made, and then found
that these factors mean that "the district court must conduct a
meaningful investigation into a defendant's constitutionally pro-
tected request to represent himself; summary dismissal is
insufficient." 273
United States v. Mateo is a case in which defense counsel was
discharged after a guilty plea and during sentencing, and in
which no Faretta hearing was conducted.274 There, the First Cir-
cuit found a Sixth Amendment violation where, after the defen-
dant discharged his defense lawyer before sentencing, the trial
court neither ruled on counsel's request to withdraw, nor ap-
pointed new counsel before sentencing.275
In addition to cases in which the pro se defendant does not
request counsel at sentencing, there are other cases in which the
defendant expressly requests representation at sentencing, but
the request is denied. This was the situation in United States v.
Taylor, where the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court's ruling
that had denied the pro se defendant's request for counsel made
after the guilty verdict in his trial.276 The request was denied on
grounds that "his initial election to proceed pro se was valid and
still effective." 2 7 While the trial court did appoint the federal
272 Id.
273 Id. "'Where a fundamental constitutional right, such as the right to coun-
sel, is concerned, courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver'... The record does not indicate that Cano waived his right to self-
representation." Id. at 517.
274 United States v. Mateo, 950 F.2d 44 (1st Cir. 1991). The case was re-
manded for resentencing. Id. at 50.
275 Id. at 49.
276 United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.),. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 883 (1991).
277 Id. at 313.
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defender who had been representing the defendant as standby
counsel during the sentencing proceeding, the circuit court held
that this was not the equivalent of appointment of counsel, be-
cause standby counsel "does not represent the defendant," and
"does not speak for the defendant or bear responsibility for his
defense." 2 78
Other circuits have also held that a defendant may revoke his
earlier waiver of counsel.279 In Menefield v. Borg, the defendant
requested an attorney at the post-trial motion stage.280 Although
he had previously waived his right to counsel and represented
himself at trial, the Ninth Circuit held that, absent a showing
that his request is made in bad faith, and because the motion for
a new trial is a "critical stage" to which sixth amendment protec-
tions attach, the Sixth Amendment was violated by denial of his
request. 281
We are certainly unwilling to deny counsel because
of some conception that the defendant's initial deci-
sion to exercise his Faretta right and represent him-
self at trial is a choice cast in stone. It is not
surprising that a criminal defendant, having de-
cided to represent himself and then having suf-
fered a defeat at trial, would realize that he would
be better served during the remainder of the case
by the assistance of counsel. A criminal defendant
may initially assert his right to self-representation
for reasons that later prove unsound. The accused
may doubt the willingness of an appointed attor-
ney to represent his interests. More often, the ac-
cused may have a baseless faith in his ability to
278 Id.
279 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 718 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 982 (1990); United States v. Holmen, 586 F.2d 322, 324 (4th Cir. 1978).
280 Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696 (9th Cir.1989)
281 Id. at 699.
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mount an effective defense. The lure of self-repre-
sentation may, however, exact a significant price;
lost at trial, the defendant may miss important op-
portunities and even create gaping holes in his
own case.
282
The court in Menefield acknowledged that a pro se defen-
dant's decision to request counsel after a waiver might be prop-
erly denied where delay may occur. However, it distinguished
between concerns arising from a delay of the trial versus delay
at sentencing or other post-trial stage:
There is, however, a substantial practical distinc-
tion between delay on the eve of trial and delay at
the time of a post-trial hearing. . . Delay immedi-
ately prior to trial engenders a significant potential
for disruption of court and witness scheduling.
Witnesses may have travelled long distances and
may be unable to accommodate more than one
trip. Losing or substantially inconveniencing wit-
nesses may prejudice the trial and the efficient ad-
ministration of justice. Shifting lengthy trials may
disrupt the court's docket.
Conversely, it is unlikely that a continuance after
the verdict will substantially interfere with the
court's or the parties' schedules. Witnesses and ju-
rors will have been dismissed. Moreover, the
282 Id. at 700 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
The accused has little recourse against the failings caused by his
own inartfulness .... ([A] defendant representing himself may
not claim ineffective assistance of counsel). Forcing the defen-
dant to stumble through post-trial proceedings serves neither
the individual nor our system of adversarial justice well. There-
fore, although we recognize that the right to counsel-once
waived-is no longer absolute, we start with the strong pre-
sumption that a defendant's post-trial request for the assistance
of an attorney should not be refused.
Id. (citing United States v. Holman, 586 F.2d 322 (4th Cir.1978) (per curiam)
(pro s plaintiff at trial retained constitutional right to counsel at sentencing).
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hearing on a post-trial motion is generally a brief
affair, lasting substantially less than a day.
Rescheduling such a hearing-more likely than
not-will not involve a significant disruption of
court scheduling. While we are aware that as a
general matter it may be more efficient to have
the motion for a new trial presented when the is-
sue is fresh in the minds of the parties and court,
that is an insufficient interest to warrant denying
defendants the assistance of counsel. We there-
fore hold that, at least in the absence of extraordi-
nary circumstances, an accused who requests an
attorney at the time of a motion for a new trial is
entitled to have one appointed, unless the govern-
ment can show that the request is made for a bad
faith purpose. 283
2. State Cases
The wide range of circumstances in which the issue of the pro-
priety or adequacy of the Faretta hearing, or a state-court
equivalent, that appears in federal jurisprudence, is also found
in state law. The cases include those in which defendants claim
they were denied the right to proceed pro se at sentencing,24 or
they were erroneously permitted to do so. 285 They revolve
around the question of whether Faretta warnings were given, or
given properly, and thereby impliedly recognize the right to
readmonishment of the right to counsel at sentencing and post-
trial motions.
In Meuhleman v. State, the Florida Supreme Court directly
addressed the question of whether the trial court is required to
obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel at every criti-
283 Id. at 699-701 (citations omitted).
284 See e.g., State v. Henry, 863 P.2d 861, -- (Ariz. 1993).
285 Meuhleman v. State, 3 So.3d 1149 (Fla. 2009).
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cal stage of the proceedings (including sentencing), by one who
understands the dangers and disadvantages of representing him
or herself:
Meuhleman was granted leave to represent him-
self... after a Faretta hearing ... Even so, a de-
fendant's right to counsel applies at each crucial
stage of the proceedings, and "[w]here the right to
counsel has been properly waived, the State may
proceed with the stage at issue; but the waiver ap-
plies only to the present stage and must be re-
newed at each subsequent crucial stage where the
defendant is unrepresented." . . . Fla. R.Crim. P.
3.111(d)(5) (2003) ("If a waiver is accepted at any
stage of the proceedings, the offer of assistance of
counsel shall be renewed by the court at each sub-
sequent stage of the proceedings at which the de-
fendant appears without counsel."). . . [T]he trial
court held a proper Faretta hearing before al-
lowing Meuhleman to represent himself at his re-
sentencing proceeding. 286
286 Id. at 1156-57. See also, Amos v. State, 618 So.2d 157 (Fla. 1993), where a
defendant discharged counsel after conviction but before sentencing; the trial
court then permitted him to proceed pro se, but failed to conduct a Faretta
hearing:
With regard to the penalty phase, we believe it is also necessary
to comment on the trial court's granting of Amos's motion to
discharge his attorney and requiring him to proceed without
counsel after Amos had requested that another attorney be ap-
pointed. No Faretta inquiry was made on the record in this pro-
ceeding and the trial court required Amos to represent himself
almost immediately after granting his motion to discharge his
counsel. Further, the trial judge gave Amos approximately ten
minutes to read depositions that had been presented to him
prior to the beginning of the penalty phase that morning.
We are not unmindful that Amos is very familiar with the crim-
inal justice system and could have been proceeding in such a
manner in an attempt to frustrate his trial on these charges.
Nevertheless, that does not justify the manner in which the trial
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The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in King v. State held
that a motion for new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution,
entitling the defendant (who discharged his attorney after sen-
tencing) to appointment of counsel.287 The court first noted the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Menefield v. Borg,288 in which the ap-
pellate court in a habeas proceeding found a Sixth Amendment
violation by a state court judge who had denied the defendant's
request for counsel to prepare a post-trial motion.289 Applying
that precedent and its rationales, i.e., that significant rights are
affected in such motions, that counsel is usefulness in preserving
claims and explaining the post-trial process, and because these
motions test the merits of the case against the defendant, the
King court found that "if an indigent defendant is constitution-
ally entitled to the assistance of counsel at sentencing and in the
first appeal as a matter or right, that defendant would be enti-
tled to the assistance of counsel in the interim period, absent a
waiver." 290
judge resolved this situation. We suggest to a future trial judge
that, if Amos insists on discharging his counsel, the court
should proceed only after a Faretta inquiry has been conducted
and with standby counsel being available for the continuation
of Amos's trial.
Id. at 163.
287 King v. State, 613 So.2d 888 (1993).
288 Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696 (9th Cir.1989).
289 The Menefield court relied on three factors in deciding whether a post-
trial motion was a critical stage for purposes of entitlement to the right to
counsel: "First, if failure to pursue strategies or remedies results in a loss of
significant rights, then Sixth Amendment protections attach. Second, where
skilled counsel would be useful in helping the accused understand the legal
confrontation, we find that a critical stage exits. Third, the right to counsel
applies if the proceeding tests the merits of the accused's case." 881 F.2dd.
at 890.
290 613 So.2dKing, supra note 276, at 891. On the question of whether the
defendant had waiver his right to counsel at the post-trial motion stage, the
court held that the record did not reflect that the defendant waived his right
to counsel and asserted the right to represent himself:
In fact, the record reflects that the appellant requested the
dismissal of his trial counsel and requested that another attor-
ney be appointed to represent him. While the record contains a
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C. The AEDPA's "Clearly-Establish Law" Requirement
in Habeas Cases
Once a defendant waives his right to counsel, does he have an
absolute (or at least presumptive) right to re-appointment of
counsel upon request at sentencing? In this article, I argue that
the right to counsel is a continuing one, limited only as a conse-
quence of a defendant's obstructionist or other bad faith con-
duct. Judges should not, in general, have discretion in the
matter. A number of state courts disagree with this position, and
the Supreme Court of the United States has not ruled on the
issue. That is why the law is not yet "clearly established" for
federal habeas corpus purposes. The latter phrase is found in a
notation from the trial judge that the appellant had indicated a
desire to represent himself on appeal and while the appellant
did indicate in his sentencing hearing that he wanted all docu-
ments sent to him for purposes of his appeal, we can find no
clear indication that the appellant knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to counsel and asserted his right to proceed pro
se. ... and we will not infer one from the record in this case. It
would appear that the appellant proceeded to represent himself
because the trial court did not promptly appoint another attor-
ney to represent the appellant when his trial counsel was al-
lowed to withdraw. In the hearing conducted on the appellant's
pro se motion for a new trial, the trial court informed the ap-
pellant that because it could not find anyone to represent the
appellant, he would be allowed to represent himself on the mo-
tion for a new trial.
Accordingly, this cause is due to be, and it hereby is, re-
manded for appointment of counsel to assist the appellant in
the preparation of his motion for a new trial.
Id at 891-92. See also, State v. Pitts, 319 P.3d 456, 458 (Haw. 2014) (holding
pro se defendant who was "overwhelmed" after conviction and requested
former counsel be re-appointed was entitled to appointment of counsel to
prepare post-verdict motions). In finding that the trial judge had erred in
"insisting that Pitts' earlier mid-trial waiver of counsel carried through
postverdict." Id. at 461, the court noted that the Supreme Court had not yet
considered "whether a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel for post-verdict motions," Id. at 462. It then went on to recognize the
right under Article I, Section 14, of the Hawaii State Constitution, and based
on the "critical" nature of the post-trial motion stage. Id. at 463.
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provision of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA), which states that a federal court may not grant a
state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus "unless the
state court's adjudication on the merits was 'contrary to, or in-
volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Fed-
eral law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States'." 29' A decision is contrary to clearly established law if the
state court "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set
forth in [Supreme Court] cases." 292
The relevance of this habeas provision, intended to stem the
flow of habeas petitions to federal courts,293 is that it prevents
federal courts from granting relief to state court pro se defend-
ants whose post-trial requests for counsel were denied (or who
were never even given a Faretta hearing upon being convicted).
Federal courts have routinely denied relief in those situations on
grounds that the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue
of readmonishment of the right to counsel after trial.294
291 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1390 (2012), citing and quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
292 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389
(2000) (opinion for the Court by O'Connor, J.). See also, Wright v. Van Pat-
ten, 552 U.S. _, 128 S.Ct. 743120 (2008) (state appellate court determina-
tion that defendant's right to counsel was not violated when defense counsel
appeared by speaker phone at plea hearing was not contrary to, or unreason-
able application of, clearly established federal law); Glebe v. Frost, __ U.S.
__ 135 S.Ct. 429 (2014) (same holding on issue of improper trial judge's
restriction upon defense counsel's closing argument);
293 Deborah L. Stahlkopf, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive Peti-
tions under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40
ARIz. L. REV. 1115, 1117 (1998) (explaining that the AEDPA's purpose was
to prevent "abuses of the Writ," but arguing that it poses "serious constitu-
tional problems" for habeas petitioners).
294 See e.g., John-Charles v. California, 646 F.3d 1243, 1249 (9th Cir. 2011)
(denying habeas relief where state court denied defendant's requests to re-
voke pretrial waiver of counsel made at voir dire and again before trial began
because the Supreme Court has made no specific rule on the issue of reap-
pointment of counsel); McCormick v. Adams, 621 F.3d 970, 980 (9th Cir.
2010) (denying habeas relief because the state's rule that a trial judge is not
obligated to restore counsel if the defendant no longer wants to represent
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Most salient to the issue under discussion is the Supreme
Court's recent holding in Marshall v. Rodgers.295 In Rodgers, a
state prisoner sought habeas relief, claiming that his right to as-
sistance of counsel was violated by the court's refusal to appoint
an attorney to assist him in preparing a post-trial motion.296 The
defendant had vacillated on whether he wanted counsel or not,
surrendered his right three times, and eventually proceeded pro
se through the trial.297 After the verdict was ruled against him,
the defendant requested counsel to help him with his post-trial
motion.298
The Ninth Circuit had reversed the District Court's denial of
the Writ, and "invoked certain Sixth Amendment precedents
from its own earlier cases and from cases in other Circuits" in
support of its decision:299
From those precedents, the panel identified two
relevant principles that it deemed to have been
clearly established by this Court's cases: first, that
a defendant's waiver of his right to trial counsel
does not bar his later election to receive assistance
of counsel at a later critical stage of the prosecu-
tion, absent proof by the State that the reappoint-
ment request was made in bad faith, . . . and,
second, that a new-trial motion is a critical
stage... Combining these two propositions, the
court held that respondent had a clearly estab-
lished right to the reappointment of counsel for
himself does not contradict clearly established federal law); Nelson v. Ala-
bama, 292 F.3d 1291, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2002) (denying habeas relief where
record showed that state court's decision that a waiver of counsel in 1987 also
applied to a 1994 re-sentencing was not in conflict with clearly established
federal law).
295 Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S.Ct. 1446 (2013).
296 Id. at 1448.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 1448-49.
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purposes of his new-trial motion, and that the Cal-
ifornia courts-which vest the trial judge with dis-
cretion to approve or deny such requests based on
the totality of the circumstances, . . . violated that
right by refusing to order the reappointment of
counsel.300
The Supreme Court "assumed, without so holding" that a
post-trial, pre-appeal motion for a new trial is a critical stage of
the prosecution.301 On the second question of whether, after a
defendant's valid waiver of counsel, a trial court has discretion
to deny a later request for reappointment of counsel, the Court
stated that the Circuit Court had correctly concluded that the
Court had never explicitly decided the question.302 It further
held that the Circuit Court's statement that "a general standard"
set forth by Supreme Court rulings could satisfy the "clearly es-
tablished" habeas requirement. 30 3 It was in applying the latter
principle, however, that the Circuit Court erred:
Although an appellate panel may, in accordance
with its usual law-of-the-circuit procedures, look
to circuit precedent to ascertain whether it has al-
ready held that the particular point in issue is
clearly established by Supreme Court precedent,
... ("We are bound by prior Sixth Circuit determi-
nations that a rule has been clearly established");
... [I]t may not canvass circuit decisions to deter-
mine whether a particular rule of law is so widely
accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would,
if presented to this Court, be accepted as correct.
The Court of Appeals failed to abide by that limi-
300 Id. at 1449.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id., citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,Tovar, supra note 114, at
664 (2004).
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tation here. Its resulting holding was erroneous
and must be reversed.304
In reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held
that it "expresses no view on the merits of the underlying Sixth
Amendment principle the respondent urges. And it does not
suggest or imply that the underlying issue, if presented on direct
review, would be insubstantial. '"305 This is as close as the Su-
preme Court has come to considering the issue addressed in this
article.
D. The Structural v. Harmless Error Issue
When it comes to sentencing in a pro se case, the issues of the
right to counsel, the right to self-representation, waiver of the
right to counsel, harmless error, and structural error "can simul-
taneously be implicated." 30 6 Courts apply "harmless error" re-
view to avoid granting relief in many criminal appeals on
grounds that the Constitution guarantees "a fair trial, not a per-
fect one." 30 7 A large jurisprudence is devoted to deciding
whether a given claimed constitutional violation by a trial judge
error was harmless, i.e., the error did not influence the jury, or
only had a slight affect, 308 or it was "structural" in the sense that
it "cast[s] so much doubt on the fairness of the trial process that,
as a matter of law,... [it] can never be considered harmless." 309
304 Id. at 1450-51.
305 Id. at 1451.
306 Michael Duvall, Judicial Review of Right-to-Counsel Violations that Oc-
cur at Sentencing: The Rule of Automatic Reversal and the Doctrine of Harm-
less Error, 23 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 111, 125 (2008) (arguing that
harmless error review is appropriate in right-to-counsel cases involving sen-
tencing, where the judge imposed the lowest possible statutory minimum and
counsel could not have further aided the defendant).
307 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986); United States v. Has-
tings, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983).
308 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 776 (1946).
309 Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988). The right to have the assis-
tance of counsel, for example, is too fundamental and absolute to allow
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Defendants must establish prejudice from an error that falls into
the harmless category, but convictions are automatically re-
versed for structural error unless the error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.3'0 The nature, significance, and circum-
stances surrounding the constitutional violation, however, may
dictate whether it is harmless or structural.
In a case involving a claimed error in the admission of a co-
erced confession, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Fulmi-
nante31l reviewed the law on this issue, giving examples of
different types of claims and their categorization:
The admission of an involuntary confession-a
classic "trial error"-is markedly different from
the other two constitutional violations . . . [that
are] not being subject to harmless-error analysis.
One of those violations,... was the total depriva-
tion of the right to counsel at trial. The other vio-
lation, involved.., a judge who was not impartial.
These are structural defects in the constitution of
the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by
"harmless-error" standards .... [O]ther cases have
added to the category of constitutional errors
which are not subject to harmless error the follow-
ing: unlawful exclusion of members of the defen-
dant's race from a grand jury,... ; the right to self-
representation at trial, . . .; and the right to public
trial, . . . Each of these constitutional deprivations
courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising
from its denial." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
310 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) "[I]t is completely impossi-
ble for us to say that the State has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the prosecutor's comments and the trial judge's instruction did not con-
tribute to petitioners' convictions. Such a machine-gun repetition of a denial
of constitutional rights, designed and calculated to make petitioners' version
of the evidence worthless, can no more be considered harmless than the in-
troduction against a defendant of a coerced confession." Id. at 26 (citations
omitted).
311 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
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is a similar structural defect affecting the frame-
work within which the trial proceeds, rather than
simply an error in the trial process itself.3' 2
The question here is, given that the right to counsel applies to
the sentencing stage of the prosecution under Mempa v. Rhay,313
does a Sixth Amendment violation at that stage constitute harm-
less or structural error? There are two scenarios in which the
issue arises: (1) where counsel is denied and (2) where the right
to self-representation is violated.
A recent decision involving a denial of counsel is United States
v. Gonzalez-Lopez, in which the Supreme Court found a Sixth
Amendment violation when the trial judge erroneously disquali-
fied defendant's chosen counsel for a courtroom protocol
violation314:
The right to select counsel of one's choice, . . . has
never been derived from the Sixth Amendment's
purpose of ensuring a fair trial. It has been re-
garded as the root meaning of the constitutional
guarantee. Where the right to be assisted by coun-
sel of one's choice is wrongly denied, therefore, it
is unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or
prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth Amendment
violation. Deprivation of the right is "complete"
when the defendant is erroneously prevented from
being represented by the lawyer he wants, regard-
312 Id. at 309-310 (citations omitted). The Court in Fulminante ultimately
held that the coerced confession claim is subject to harmless error analysis,
Id. at 295, and that the state did not meet its burden of proving its introduc-
tion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 297.
313 389 U.S. 128 (1967). Mempa, supra note 138.
314 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006). Pro hac vice de-
fense counsel passed notes to local counsel prompting the trial judge to find
he had violated court rule prohibiting more than one lawyer on a side to
conduct cross-examination of a witness. Id. at 142.
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less of the quality of the representation he
received. 315
The ruling in Gonzalez-Lopez arises in the trial context. But
in Lockhart v. Fretwell, the Supreme Court addressed a claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel at sentencing based on a failure to
raise an objection. Namely, that the trial court had unconstitu-
tionally "double-counted" an element of the crime (pecuniary
gain) for which he was convicted for guilt purposes, and again
for sentencing purposes as an aggravating factor. 316 The Su-
preme Court reasoned that this objection would have been
based on a case that was later overruled, thus, "The result of the
sentencing proceeding in the present case was neither unfair nor
unreliable." The Court of Appeals, which had decided Collins in
1985, overruled it in Perry four years later. Had the trial court
chosen to follow Collins, counsel's error would have "deprived
respondent of the chance to have the state court make an error
in his favor." 317 The fact an ineffectiveness claim during sentenc-
ing was recognized as a Sixth Amendment structural violation
gives support to the argument here regarding the right to
readmonishment of the right to counsel after trial.
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Virgil held that the trial
judge erred by not conducting a Faretta inquiry when the defen-
dant sought to proceed pro se at sentencing.318 That error, the
court held, was not subject to harmless error review:
If a court's error in denying counsel at trial, ....
and on appeal, . . . cannot be rehabilitated with
harmless error analysis, we fail to see how at sen-
tencing this type of Faretta error, which is the
functional equivalent of improperly proceeding
315 Id. at 147-48 (2006) (citations omitted). See also, Holloway v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1978) (defense counsel's conflict of interest throughout
the proceeding held not subject to harmless error rule).
316 Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).
317 Id. at 371.
318 444 F.3dVirgil, supra note 249, at 456.
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without any counsel, can be reviewed for harmless
error. Accordingly, we hold that Faretta viola-
tions of this type, even at the sentencing stage, are
so fundamentally violative of due process that the
error is harmful per se. Our holding today surely
is not groundbreaking; rather, we merely clarify
and explicitly state that which our precedent has
long recognized.3'9
Similarly, in Hays v. Arave, the Ninth Circuit addressed the
question of whether a state court defendant was denied due pro-
cess when he was extradited to another state and was therefore
unable to attend his sentencing.320 Holding that it was a denial
of due process, the court found the error not subject to harmless
error review: "[W] e hold that unconstitutional in absentia sen-
tencing is a 'structural' error and that a sentence resulting from
such a proceeding cannot be affirmed on the basis of harmless
error." 32' The court gave three reasons for its conclusion:
Our conclusion that unconstitutional in absentia
sentencing constitutes a structural error under
Fulminante follows partly from an analysis of the
nature of sentencing proceedings. The outcome of
that process-a crucial and wholly separate part of
a criminal prosecution-quite literally can mean
the difference between life and death. It is fre-
quently the most important part of the criminal
proceeding; in fact, because approximately ninety
percent of all prosecutions culminate in guilty
pleas, sentencing often is the only contested pro-
ceeding-the only one in which the individual and
the state disagree about the proper outcome.
Constitutional errors affecting the entire sentenc-
ing proceeding, like constitutional errors affecting
Volume 8, Number 2
319 Id. at 456-57 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
320 Hays v. Arave, 977 F.2d 475, 477 (9th Cir. 1992).
321 Id. at 479.
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the entire trial, must be viewed with the utmost
concern .... [T]he right to be present and partici-
pate in one's own sentencing is at least as critical
and, like lack of counsel, results in the defendant's
fate being determined without the presence of a
crucial participant in a criminal proceeding. 322
For the second scenario where the right of self-representation
is denied, albeit also at trial, we have the language in McKaskle
v. Wiggins, 323 stating that an improper denial of a request to pro-
ceed pro se at trial is "not amenable to harmless error analysis.
The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be
harmless." 32 4 But, some courts have nevertheless created an ex-
ception to the structural error rule for cases in which defendants
complain that the court denied their request to proceed pro se.
For instance, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Maness re-
jected on harmless error grounds the defendant's claim that the
trial court erred in denying him his right to proceed pro se at a
resentencing hearing. 325 It held that "violating a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice is subject to
harmless error analysis if the violation occurred only at sentenc-
ing and not at the guilt phase of trial."326 The court reasoned
that "structural errors-which are not subject to harmless error
review-are defined as errors that 'permeate[ ] the entire con-
duct of the trial from beginning to end or affect[ ] the frame-
work within which the trial proceeds.' 32 7 Because the denial to
proceed pro se at (re)sentencing did not "permeate[ ] the entire
322 Id. at 479-80 (citations omitted).
323 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8 (1984).
324 United States v. Maness, 566 F.3d at 896. The court also cited United
States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516, 524 (9th Cir.1994), for this proposition.
325 566 F.3dManess at 894 (9th Cir. 2009).
326 566 F.3dId. at 896.
327 Id.
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conduct of the trial from beginning to end or affect[ ] the frame-
work within which the trial proceeds'. '328
Similar analysis applies to Maness' request to pro-
ceed pro se at his Ameline sentencing remand.
We hold that an improper denial of a defendant's
motion to proceed pro se at sentencing, rather
than at trial, is not a structural error and is thus
subject to harmless error analysis. The error is not
intrinsically harmful to the entire proceedings....
The appellate court may review the sentencing
proceedings and ascertain beyond a reasonable
doubt whether the error contributed to the sen-
tence imposed.... Indeed, the record here is quite
evident that the district court's denial of Maness'
request to represent himself did not cause any er-
ror because, although it did not allow Maness to
proceed without an attorney, the court did permit
Maness to file briefs and motions pro se. The
court acted upon those pro se filings, ordering the
government to respond to several motions and
granting one. It is thus clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Sixth Amendment error did not re-
sult in prejudice. 329
CONCLUSION
We return to the case of the Yangs, the people on another
planet in a Star Trek episode who knew they had certain rights,
but were not aware of their specific nature. Pro se defendants
are in a similar position when they unsuccessfully defend them-
selves at trial, or enter a guilty plea without counsel, knowing
328 Citing Id., citing United States v. Walters, 309 F.3d 589, 592-93 (9th
Cir.2002) (omitting internal quotations) (holding that denial of substitute,
out-of-state counsel's motion to appear pro hac vice was harmless, and not a
structural error).
329 566 F.3dWalters at 896-97.
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that they have waived their right to counsel. They may assume
that their original waiver of counsel is binding at the sentencing
stage, and may never even request counsel to represent them to
prepare a post-trial motion or for sentencing. Their assumption
is supported by some courts, which have held that their waiver
of counsel, once made, applies to the remaining stages of the
prosecution, and hold that judges are not required to readmon-
ish them of their right to counsel. Other courts, however, recog-
nize the pro se defendant's right to counsel at the post-trial
motion or sentencing stages, require the trial judge to conduct
another Faretta hearing, and permit reappointment of counsel
upon request, absent bad faith conduct on the part of the
defendant.
This article argues that pro se defendants, like the Yangs, are
entitled to be informed of their post-trial right to counsel upon a
finding or verdict of guilt. They should be admonished that their
Sixth Amendment right to counsel continues through all critical
stages of the prosecution, a right which is even stronger in capi-
tal cases because of Eighth Amendment requirements that their
mitigation evidence be presented to the sentencer. Given the
complexity of contemporary guideline sentencing, the impor-
tance of sentencing to the defendant and society, the signifi-
cance of counsel's role in sentencing, and the cherished nature
of the right to counsel generally, it is only reasonable, and con-
sistent with the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
the Sixth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment - as well as
Supreme Court decisions interpreting those amendments - that
courts readmonish pro se defendants post-trial of their right to
counsel for post-trial motions and sentencing, and presump-
tively reappoint counsel for them upon request.
Neither the Yangs nor unsuccessful pro se defendants should
be denied knowledge of their rights. Pro se defendants in par-
ticular need to know - and the Constitution requires - that,
while they have "made their bed," they need not lie in it.
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